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**COUNTERING TERRORISM THROUGH CONTROL OF
PAKISTAN'S INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

by

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September 2014

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**COUNTERING TERRORISM THROUGH CONTROL OF PAKISTAN'S
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

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ABSTRACT

Pakistan has a peculiar information environment that has not been researched in detail. The dynamics of the information environment have changed in urban areas due to technological advancements; however, the rural areas are still far from the effects of such advancements. This thesis explores the peculiarities of the information environment in Pakistan and draws lessons from the Sri Lankan fight with the LTTE and U.S. efforts to contain terrorism (on U.S. soil) since 9/11. It brings out the root causes of terrorism in Pakistan and the role played by the information environment in strengthening this menace (especially Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan). The thesis is useful in learning the ways and means to optimally utilize the information environment of Pakistan for fighting terrorism. It might also be beneficial in formulating an information policy for Pakistan, for long- and short-term effects.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEWC	Airborne Early Warning and Control
ART	Al Rashid Trust
ASWJ	Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat
BLA	Baluchistan Liberation Army
BTF	British Tamil Forum
CBRNE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COG	Center of Gravity
CPLC	Citizen-Police Liaison Committee
CT	Counter Terrorism
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
EW	Electronic Warfare
FATA	Federally Administrated Tribal Areas
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HuJI	Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
HuM	Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
HuMA	Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-Alami
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISPs	Internet Service Providers
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JeM	Jaish-e-Muhammad
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JTTFs	Joint Terrorism Task Forces
JUI-F	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam – Fazl-ur-Rehman Group
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols
LTTE	Liberation of Tamil Tiger Eelam
MILDEC	Military Deception
MQM	Muthahida Qaumi Movement
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NSA	National Security Agency
NTAS	National Terrorism Advisory System
OODA	Observe, Orient, Decide and Act
OPSEC	Operational Security
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PBS	Pakistan Bureau of Statistics
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PML (N)	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PTGTE	Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Elam
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RAND	Research and Development
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
SLRC	Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation
SMP	Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSP	Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
TEWG	Terrorism Early Warning Group
TJP	Tehreek -e-Jafria
TNFJ	Tehreek Nifaz Fiqah-e-Jafria

TNSM	Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi
TRO	Tamil Rehabilitation Organization
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
U.S.	United States
UTN	UmmahTamir-e-Nau
VoT	Voice of Tigers
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTF	World Tamil Forum

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Pakistan has suffered a lot from the menace of terrorism. The security forces of Pakistan have given away more than 7,000 lives, and financial loss has reached more than \$68 billion. Pakistan also fears that the increased involvement of India in Afghan affairs may turn it into a proxy war. The serious concerns and issues faced by Pakistan necessitate a clear and effective approach to fight terrorism in the country. This research focuses on maligning the information environment use by terrorists groups and use of this environment to fight terrorism.

The research work starts with the importance of understanding the information environment in general and of Pakistan in particular. The frame work of discussion on the information environment is set as the use of information, physical and cognitive domains by individuals, organizations, and system (based on U.S. Joint Publication 3–13, *Information Operations*). Having looked at the information environment in general, the thesis focuses on the information environment of Pakistan where keeping pace with technological advancements of the world is considered more of a luxury than necessity. Other basic needs of society take priority in Pakistan. The government has not managed the information environment, whereas terrorist organizations are making effective use of it to target their audiences. To limit the scope, research is limited to religious extremism and in particular Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Birth of the TTP, its objectives, leadership, strength, support from national and international players, and structural weaknesses, are discussed in detail.

The Sri Lankan government defeat of LTTE and U.S. measures to prevent terrorism on its soil after 9/11 are evaluated. Pertinent lessons are drawn from these models for inclusion in Pakistan's management of the information environment. Sri Lankan government grand strategy of define, isolate and defeat, and especially the measures to isolate the LTTE merited attention. The U.S. use of technology (fusion centers) and public awareness to report unusual matters, has increased the eyes and ears of counter-terrorism force in pre-empting any

terrorist plan. Next, we look at the theories of Maurice Tugwell (psychological strategy of terrorism) and Gordon McCormick (influenced the process of terrorism), to evaluate why terrorists use information operations. The research covers the way Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is making use of information environment to effectively influence different target audiences—making use of religious propaganda for pro-TTP and using coercive measures to deter anti-TTP audience.

The thesis provides countermeasures for the control of terrorism in Pakistan at individual and system/organizational levels. An overarching strategy is suggested to isolate and curtail religious terrorism. The internal differences of TTP, following of inaccurate scripts, and a need to stop the support from foreign elements, are highlighted in detail. Some very specific U.S. technological measures of networking complete criminal and terrorist data, (fusion centers) have been suggested. The complexity of the situation has also been captured in a system dynamics model, for the ease of decision making and analysis of various measures. The thesis concludes with issues that merit attention before making any serious endeavor to manage the information environment of Pakistan. Will any democratic government be able to carry out political reforms, like limiting the role of religion in politics and eliminating support of terrorist organizations for political gains, without the fear of losing popular support? Will Pakistan be able to limit the role of international players in its internal affairs (support of terrorist outfits), through diplomatic efforts?

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I. INTRODUCTION

There's a war out there old friend—a world war. And it's not about who's got the most bullets; it's about who controls the information. What we see and hear, how we work, what we think. It's all about information.

—Cosmo

A. BACKGROUND

The Information boom that the civilized world has seen in the last century has had multi-faceted effects in almost all domains of life. People today are more aware, exposed, and learned as compared to people of the past. Information streaming has added complexities to the world in addition to positive effects on society. Terrorism being the most dangerous of all social evils, has also found its way into cyber world. It is serving them to attract fresh recruits, keep their networks alive, finance their heinous acts, and organize actions. Developed countries are cognizant of this fact and therefore, have developed ways and means to monitor such illicit activities in the information domain. The developing world is still struggling to keep pace with this technology because of their financial constraints. Pakistan is one such developing nation, which has a peculiar problem of being situated in the heart of terrorist infested areas. The Importance of adopting modern infrastructure in information domain becomes very important for Pakistan.

Terrorism has been recognized in its current shape after September 11, 2001. Pakistan emerged as a key player because of its geographical location and its role in ousting the U.S.S.R from Afghanistan. Terrorists have been observed making use of the information environment for the spread of terrorism, recruitment and their operational requirements. The effective use of the information environment has helped terrorists achieve their objectives. Pakistan has had multiple root causes for the birth and spread of terrorism. The extremism in Pakistan flourished during the Afghan Jihad in 80's, which also served the

purpose of keeping the Kashmiri freedom struggle alive. This environment helped the extremist thoughts to prosper in a heavily populous and economically weak country. The range of terrorist groups spread from sectarian issues, Kashmir support, Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Balochistan Liberation Army and politically supported hooligans. Violence in Pakistan has been on the rise since 2004, as terrorist groups have targeted political leaders, military, police, tribal leaders and minority Shia sect. The rarely heard phenomenon of suicide attacks has become a routine in terrorist attacks. The Taliban associated with Al-Qaeda has formed a network by finding common cause with terrorist groups that target Shia and those with criminal enterprises in Karachi. Adding to the problems of a poorly governed country, terrorism and the law and order situation appear to be the biggest worries and hurdles on Pakistan's path to prosperity. Information technology has given recognition to the terrorist groups. Terrorists reach out to the public through press releases and videos, websites, and radio broadcasts. The open media, which gained strength during President Pervez Musharraf's era of government, gives full coverage to the activities of terrorist groups and paves their way to greater popularity.

While fighting terrorists, the security forces of Pakistan have lost more than 7,000 lives and financial losses have reached \$68 billion.¹ Pakistan also fears that the increased involvement of India in Afghan affairs may turn it into a proxy war. The serious concerns and issues faced by Pakistan necessitate a clear and effective approach to fight terrorism in the country. This research focuses on undermining the information environment use by terrorists groups and using this environment to fight terrorism.

¹ *Dawn News*, "Terrorism: Pakistan's Sacrifices," November 13, 2012, <http://www.dawn.com/news/763615/terrorism-pakistans-sacrifices>.

B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

The research will endeavor to answer the following questions:

1. What are the basic features of the information environment of Pakistan and where does it stand in comparison with other countries?
2. How do terrorist organizations use the information environment to their advantage?
3. How effective will it be to use the information environment to break the terrorist networks within Pakistan?
4. What is the relationship between human and technical networks in Pakistan?
5. How can the technology be managed to fight terrorism in Pakistan?

C. METHODS AND RESOURCES

The research employs the multiple comparative case study approach, evaluating the global information environment and that of other countries facing terrorism issues of the magnanimity of Pakistan. The Sri Lankan fight of terrorism against the LTTE/Tamil Tigers is one case that we studied in detail. For a futuristic overview, we also looked at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, focusing on its efforts to monitor and curb the spread of extremism in mainland U.S. The research about other countries was taken from existing case studies and official websites. The main focus of research remains on the use of the information environment by terrorists in Pakistan and its effectiveness, followed by how to break the terrorist network through information operations; we also made use of journal articles, official databases, research papers, reports, and other publications.

D. THESIS OVERVIEW

Our work begins with the importance of understanding the information environment around us. It makes analogies with other advancements in the scientific domains that have brought significant changes in the way we think and make our decisions. It discusses the role of information from ancient times through modern era and its role in various wars. Having looked at the information environment around us, the thesis focuses on the information environment of Pakistan in particular. Pakistan belongs to the developing world where keeping pace with technological advancements is considered more of a luxury than a necessity; there are basic needs of society that take precedence. The information domain has remained no different in this regard. The tyranny is that the forces of evil (terrorist) organizations in the north frontier part of Pakistan are not as ignorant of the information domain as they might be considered. This thesis discusses these exploitations by terrorist networks, and the counter tactics adopted by the modern world. The research work focuses on the counter-terrorism methodology of Pakistan via the information domain, and identifies areas that need immediate revamping in terms of resources, organizational restructuring, and training. The thesis recommends some short-term and long-term measures that would help Pakistan to not only break terrorist networks within the countries, but also to help control/monitor fundamentalism in the society.

Chapter II explains the role of information environment in influencing a society. Basing on U.S. Joint Publication 3–13, this chapter builds the framework for our analysis of Pakistan information environment. Chapter III describes the evolution of terrorism and its root causes in Pakistan. It narrows down to Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is the main focus of our research. Organizational and operational structure of TTP is explained and analyzed in detail. In Chapter IV comparative study of Sri Lankan counter insurgency operation against LTTE and U.S. measures to counter terrorism inside the

country has been carried out. Inferences are drawn from these two models, to develop information environment based counter terrorism strategy of Pakistan. Chapter V explains the exploitation of the information environment by terrorist organizations globally, in general and TTP in particular. Chapter VI concludes our analysis of information environment based counter terrorism strategy for Pakistan. We suggest some information environment related measures for incorporation in the overall strategy.

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II. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The phenomenon of globalization is largely attributed to advancements in communications and connectivity mediums. The wired and wireless means of communications provide opportunities, as well as vulnerabilities for the modern world. It is believed that the advancements in communication technology were necessitated due to the desire to transfer messages (information) at greater speeds. This fact alone conveys the importance of information and its dissemination to improve connectivity. Unfortunately, history has seen military campaigns as the breeding environment of technological advancements. Use of an informational advantage to one's own benefit can be traced back to even Mongols who spread fear of their barbaric invasions among the tribes they were planning to invade. This way they would suppress their enemy psychologically even before physically fighting the war. Information operations have always been an important aspect of military planners.

The U.S. Joint Publication on information operations defines information as a tool that can influence, usurp, disrupt, or corrupt an adversary's decision-making mechanism.² It defines the information environment as "the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information."³ The adversary can be not only an enemy fighting war, but also a business competitor, political party, or an opponent team in any sport. The information environment has been characterized into three dimensions that continuously interact with individuals, organizations and the systems (shown in Figure 1).

² U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *U.S. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations*, November 27, 2012, 14.

³ *Ibid.*, VII.

The physical dimension includes infrastructure that decision makers or policy makers use to create effects in information environment.⁴ This includes humans, newspapers, books, TV, microwave towers, radio broadcast stations, and Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The information dimension is the actual place where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. The cognitive dimension is related to the minds of the people receiving, understanding, and disseminating information or taking action on the information. It is very important to understand this information environment, because information operations are conducted in this environment. Whenever we want to plan an information operation, we have to select a target audience, which can be an individual, a group, a network, or a nation. This target audience is influenced by studying its information environment and then selecting courses of action to influence the target audience to take decision of our choice.⁵ This tactic is useful in countering any adversary. Information operations take place in the information environment.

⁴ Ibid., 15, pp 2.

⁵ Ibid., I-1.




Figure 1. The information environment⁶

The information environment has been present and evolving all through societal advancements, but is more prevalent in the present information age. The problem; however, the information environment is vulnerable to exploitation by forces of good and evil alike. In this chapter, we relate a few examples in recent history and present time where individuals, organizations, and systems were exploited for the purpose of waging war or inciting social movement. It is pertinent to mention that the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has seen the maximum exploitation in this domain by both sides (forces of free world and terrorists).

A. PROPAGANDA IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The origin of conflict can be frequently traced to false perception.

–Burton

‘Enemy’ is a strong word because it is associated with emotions like anger, hatred, frustration, envy, jealousy, fear, and distrust. The characterization of an individual or/and organization or/and system as enemy or hostile, may be termed as demonization, and is destined to be met with hate, violence, battle.

⁶ Ibid., 15.

and war.⁷ Understanding the ‘enemy’ is perceiving the information environment in which the enemy exists. The most agonizing environment would be one where you cannot discriminate between your friend and foe. Propaganda is one such tool that aims to reduce this discrimination.

According to *Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary*, propaganda consists of ideas or statements that are often false or exaggerated and are spread in order to help a cause to take root, a political leader to take power, and a government to serve its political will. In terms of communication, propaganda is used to effect an adversary’s decision-making capability by creating uncertainty in facts or false projection of truth. Today we understand propaganda much better in terms of the information environment, and thus call it ‘information war.’ Propaganda takes birth in the information domain of the environment. It affects the cognitive domain where decisions are made, while transmitting through the physical domain (TV, Internet, radio, and print media). It is principally based on the concept of “actions following perceptions.” Walter Lippmann⁸ is of the view that if we can sugar coat a lie in a way that it looks like the truth, and mediate the perception/misperception of individuals, group or like the community (organization or system), we can effectively change the biases of society, country, or nation.

Clausewitz defined war as *an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will*.⁹ In today’s information age, we can use means other than violence to achieve the same. U.S. doctrine defines information warfare as collective use of PSYOP, military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), electronic

⁷ Marthe L. Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, and Thomas Preston, *Introduction to Political Psychology*, (Mahwah, New Jersey and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2009), 54.

⁸ Walter Lippmann was an American writer, reporter, and political commentator famous for coining the term “Cold War” in his 1922 book *Public Opinion*. His book is also known for its critical assessment of functional democratic government and for irrational social perceptions that affect individual behaviors. The first chapter of his book “The World Outside and Pictures in Our Head” is read, even today, by people related to influence warfare.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. by Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Rosalie West (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984).

warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO) and related fields of these terms, to affect (influence) the enemy.¹⁰ This is what was known as “Political Warfare” during World War II. The United States Joint Chief of Staff in World War II defined psychological warfare more broadly stating, “Psychological warfare employs any weapon to influence the mind of the enemy.” The weapons are psychological only in the effect they produce and not because of the weapons themselves.¹¹ Today, one’s credit is another’s discredit; therefore, information can be manipulated in either way to influence the society. In World War II ‘Airborne Leaflet Propaganda’¹² was used extensively by Allied forces to change the perceptions of German soldiers. For Allied Forces it was a positive use, whereas for Germany it was hostile use of propaganda.

If we consider the society as a system, then the individuals are the elementary components of the society, which are loosely coupled, but in cohesive organizational structure existing in the society. In modern-day propaganda war (information war), the enemy tries to change the symbols’ of perception by affecting public opinion, which in turn affects the decision makers. It is the public opinion that makes one person a hero and the other a devil. The most interesting portrait of a symbol is that which arises spontaneously in a people’s mind (e.g., due to an act or incident that grips the minds of the people).¹³ An adversary, as an opportunity, can seize initiative on this belief. For example Osama bin Laden claimed responsibility for 9/11; the very next moment, he became the most wanted person in the world. He became the number one enemy of the state and civilized society. Nobody cared or knew that he was a key ally in defeating communism in Afghanistan. This is the same Communism against which the U.S. fought a long war in Vietnam. The nuisance value gave

¹⁰ Dorothy E. Denning, “Information Operation, and Terrorism,” *Journal of Information Warfare* (2004): 3.

¹¹ Robert H. Keyserlingk, *Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma* (McGill-Queen’s Press-MQUP, 1988), 131.

¹² James Alexander Campbell Brown, *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing* (Middlesex, England: Penguin books, 1963).

¹³ Ibid.

him (the adversary) referent power¹⁴ to recruit lots of like-minded aides all around the world. This implies that when fear and hatred take complete dominance in the minds of public, it is then the public opinion of love and hatred is developed.¹⁵ This aspect is very important to understand; it is the foremost strategy of today's enemy (terrorists). They create an environment of fear in the society by conducting suicide or IEDs attacks and maligning the regular forces/institutions through propaganda.

Since 2001, the world has seen an increase in warfare. Extensive military planning and decision making has gone toward countering the menace of terrorism. World coalitions have gathered to devise effective mechanisms to make this world a safer place. Although a lot of success has been achieved, pilferages and lapses in security can still be seen. In Afghanistan, more than 10 years down the line into war, coalition forces are still fighting the strong narrative of the Taliban that "U.S. led forces are there to destroy Islam".¹⁶ Incidents of Abu Ghareeb's¹⁷ fratricide and burning of the holy Quran¹⁸ (however accidental it may be) were detrimental for U.S. credibility in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the enemy was quick in developing propaganda on such incidents because nobody could deny their reality. As time progresses, information (acquisition and dissemination) will continue to play a pivotal role in military decision making and planning.

¹⁴ John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, *The Bases of Social Power* (University of Michigan, 1959), 161.

¹⁵ Ibid., 161.

¹⁶ Fernando M. Lujan, "How to Get Afghans to Trust Us Once Again," *Washington Post*, March 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-to-get-afghans-to-trust-us-once-again/2012/03/01/gIQAfhZ9mR_story.html.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Kevin Sieff, "U.S. Probe of Koran Burning Finds 5 Troops Responsible," *Washington Post*, March 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-probe-of-koran-burning-finds-5-soldiers-responsible-afghan-clerics-demand-public-trial/2012/03/02/gIQAwwJqYmR_story.html.

B. WAR IN THE PHYSICAL DOMAIN

War is regarded as nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means.

–Carl Von Clausewitz

Historically, information, its availability and dissemination, has been an over-arching factor of military campaigns. Over the past few decades, the information boom has brought wars into the living rooms of common men. Actions of soldiers and decisions of commanders, in the field, have had direct implications on morale of public. The problem is multiplied, when the public sees these events through (suppose to be) the analytical eyes of a (trusted) media. The trustworthiness of the source, namely the anchor, the network, or the publisher, causes the audience to accept the story in its given format without questioning the motives that may have been behind its slant.¹⁹ Towing the same analogy of society as a ‘system,’ we think that media is aimed primarily toward the “individuals” aspect of the information environment. Individuals make public opinion and public opinion is very important for organizations representing the public. These public organizations are at the core of a true democratic system.

Comparing the coverage of war and famine in Sudan with that in Somalia shows some of the factors in media gatekeeping,²⁰ many of which have nothing to do with the event itself. Similar conditions existed at the same time in each country, but Somalia became the focus of media attention and from that, humanitarian aid. Sudan, on the other hand, had limited access to media, and so remained neglected from any international aid. Media has become a tool of foreign policy and world politics. Being at the forefront of global politics, the U.S. has a very prominent media role in influencing public opinion. In the U.S., media is closely linked to public opinion and public policy.²¹ Media attention to an issue

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Theresa Bly, “Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. National Policy” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002), 15.

²¹ Ibid., 15.

affects decision making because policymakers understand that mass media shapes public opinion and they want public opinion on their side. The major concerns for U.S. media, in deciding whether to cover a certain event, are driven by factors like location and nationality of the victims, the foreign policy orientation of the U.S. government, and the accessibility of the affected areas to the press corps. In the case of Sudan and Somalia, the only difference was that coverage by the media was made easier by the logistics of operating in Somalia²² that is why it got more coverage than Sudan.

Similarly, the media has a prominent role in spreading propaganda, with many examples where media campaigns were effectively used to spread propaganda. This aspect of media comes into play when the media portray a negative image of the enemy (Iraq weapons of mass destruction) and reinforces it with rhetoric in support of their own side (Al-Qaida getting hold of weapons of mass destruction from Iraq). This propaganda enables the decision makers (U.S. congress), to authorize military invasion with public support.

This tool is a double-edged sword; the enemy can also utilize it in order to malign the friendly side. How it generally works is a simple media tactic that includes: using selective stories that are wide-covering and objective, presentations of partial facts, and offering judgments and conclusions without including the supporting evidence and chain of reasoning that led to them. What results is a shortcut in the reasoning process that removes the possibility of critical thought and analysis from the audience, and encourages them to accept the presented judgment as fact. This aspect needs to be guarded by state leaders, as taxpayers would fall prey to negative propaganda and may demand immediate actions by the government who can succumb to public pressure very easily (U.S., Vietnam, and Somalia withdrawal). The media are not alone in their manipulation of the facts. During time of war (and even during peace) the military

²² Steven Livingston, "Suffering in Silence: Media Coverage of War and Famine in Sudan," in *Massacres to Genocide: the Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), 68.

operates in a similar fashion by restricting the information presented to the media and hence what the public is told.

Recent events in the authoritarian Arab world termed as “Arab Springs” (Egypt, Libya) brought a new dimension of media into the limelight. Facebook and Twitter were thought of as tools of revolution in the Middle East. Following the Arab Spring the world began debating whether social media caused the social mobilization or simply helped in the communication process.²³ Information travelling over the Internet has a peculiarity compared to information over other media. Internet users are mostly a literate part of the population. Therefore, the Internet may be more effective in the modern world than in countries which are still struggling with their literacy rates, where culturally orthodox means of communications are still prevalent. The Internet has not had huge impact on such societies.

C. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT OF PAKISTAN

When you give everyone a voice and give people power, the system usually ends up in a really good place.

–Mark Zuckerberg

Pakistan is part of the developing nations that are struggling to deal with poverty, illiteracy, health issues, political instability, and terrorism. The information environment of Pakistan is also defined by these struggling. The cognitive domain of the information environment in Pakistan is the mass of population, which is characterized by its social fabric defined earlier. To target such a weak or unstable society is very easy compared to a well-educated and stable society. In Pakistani society (rural population mainly), information flow is mostly through word-of-mouth, and the credibility of the source is not important; only the information is important. With the mushroom growth of TV and radio channels in Pakistan, this phenomenon has multiplied. Similarly, the physical

²³ Lilas N. Gawhry, “Assessing The Impact of Social Media on The 25 January 2011 Egyptian Revolution” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 6.

domain of the information environment not only covers all the previously mentioned elements, but also elements like mosques, Madrassas, and religious gatherings, which take a major role in disseminating information in Pakistani society. The information domain is the actual message travelling back-and-forth in the society. Let us analyze the information environment of Pakistan in terms of Individuals, organizations and systems.

1. Individuals

Unlike in developed nations, in struggling societies like Pakistan personalities are more important than the media (e.g., 'Mullah' giving a fatwa in a remote village would be accepted immediately without realizing the context, authenticity, or credibility of the person). Similarly, a feudal lord or a 'Panchait'/'Jirga' (group of tribal elders who act as a court) can decide the fate of a person without subjecting him to any law of the state. Politicians are accepted on the basis of their wealth, social strength in society, and cultural bondage, rather than their vision, political soundings, or welfare policies. Since people voting for political candidates are mostly illiterate, political campaigns are based on political gatherings of masses or political sermons (Jalsa), rather than modern information systems. In Pakistani society, individuals are mostly divided on the basis of two major affiliations: ethnicity and religious sect. This is why the political system of Pakistan is also based on these two major divides. The Mullah has a prominent role in politics, as does the feudal lord.

Since our research focuses on religious terrorism in Pakistan, we elaborate here on how religiously-influenced information is transmitted into the community. The Mullah's importance in society has emerged from the traditional role of mosques in a Muslim society. We lay emphasis on understanding the role of mosques in the information environment of Pakistan, because this is the elementary individual aspect of the environment and is probably a huge contributor in the spread of extremism and radicalized Islam in Pakistani society. Mosques were/are considered to be the hub of social activities in rural areas of

Pakistan (approximately 67 percent²⁴). They provide an environment where people offer prayers together, interact socially, exchange views and news, conduct community meetings, decide important matters, and perform marriage rituals (Nikkah). Messages of funerals, lost and found, congregations, and other important messages are hailed from the mosque loudspeakers. In such a scenario, a person in charge of the mosque (Mullah) is kept in high esteem. He is considered more pious and his opinion definitely matters. He is supposedly educated in a Madrassas, where he learned the Quran by heart (Hafiz). Rarely would he be a graduate of a recognized and reputable Madrasa where complete Islamic scholarship is taught. This linkage of the mullah with a Madrasa is also very important to understand for the purpose of our research regarding the information environment of Pakistan.

The Madrasa has a prominent role in the literary heritage of the Muslim world. Any center of education imparting religious and scientific, social education is called as a Madrasa. Unfortunately, in Pakistani society it is linked with a place where only religious education is imparted. There are many Madrassas in Pakistan that are centers of excellence for true religious education, as well as producing religious scholars of international levels. Many of those are run as an extension to mosques where orphan and poor children are given free Quranic education. These Madrassas are generally run on donations from the community, where the mullah of the mosque is in charge of the Madrasa; making him an absolute authority in Islamic reference for that community.

To understand the Pakistani information environment, we must statistically evaluate other physical domain tools available in the Pakistani environment. Currently in Pakistan, 20 million (out of 180 million) people use the Internet. That figure amounts to only slightly over 10 percent of the population. In 2007, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) ranked Pakistan's position 127 out

²⁴ Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, *Area, Population, Density and Urban/Rural Proportion* (Government of Pakistan, August 25, 2014), <http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/tables/AREA%20POPULATION%20DENSITY%20AND%20URBAN%20RURAL%20PROPORTION.pdf>.

of 159 countries in terms of access to online communication, use, and skills. At that time, the Internet growth rate for Pakistan was higher than for any other country because the ICT usage in the country was barely existent at the time of previous evaluation in 2002. However, the growth slowed substantially in 2008, with the country's position ranking 128.²⁵ This was due to insufficient development and quality of the network, and of course by low levels of education. The Internet is still accessed mainly through dial-up connections, and only about 1.3 million people use broadband connections in Pakistan.²⁶

These statistics suggest that Internet and social media have not yet been acknowledged as a means of communication by most of Pakistani society; the major reason being the illiteracy and vast disparity in the urban and rural population. According to Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS), 67 percent of the population is rural.²⁷ The rural area of the population lacks even the necessities of life, like food, shelter, medicine, and hygiene. In this condition, to expect that this population would be conversant with use of mobile Internet, social media or other 'E-Contents' would definitely be out of context. Surprisingly, though, broadcast media, particularly TV, stands out in this denomination. TV serves as the source of news and information more than newspapers or radios in Pakistan. Rural areas are also finding TV overwhelmingly more popular than radio and newspaper. At this point, we can infer that at the individual level of the information environment for a typical Pakistani community, the Mullah is still a more effective tool to affect public opinion (cognitive domain) through his mosque

²⁵ The ICT Development Index (IDI) is composed of three sub-indexes measuring access (fixed telephony, mobile telephony, international Internet bandwidth, households with computers and households with Internet), use and intensity of use (Internet users, fixed broadband and mobile broadband) and skills (adult literacy rate, gross secondary and tertiary enrollment).

²⁶ Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, *Telecom indicators* (Government of Pakistan, 2014), http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=269:telecom-indicators&catid=124:industry-report&Itemid=599. The development and communication statistics for Pakistan and other selected countries are given in Appendix A.

²⁷ Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, *Area, Population, Density and Urban/Rural Proportion* (Government of Pakistan, August 25, 2014), <http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/tables/AREA%20POPULATION%20DENSITY%20AND%20URBAN%20RURAL%20PROPORTION.pdf>.

(physical domain) by disseminating radicalized/neutral messages (information domain), rather than using other modern day tools like the radio, TV, or Internet.

2. Organizations

Individuals make organizations which play an important role in affecting integration of the society. In the Pakistani environment, organizations that matter in the society, or which have pronounced affect in shaping public opinion of the society, are again based on political or religious affiliations. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are mostly foreign funded and therefore have very little credibility due to skepticism about their role in Pakistani society.²⁸ Taking a dip into the religion-based organizations, these organizations lie at the very core of Pakistan's civil society. Since Pakistan was founded on the premise of religion, religious parties enjoy overarching impact in the social sector. The relationship between the state and religious organization has remained cordial ever since Pakistan's inception in 1947.²⁹ The political legitimacy of religious organizations has been manipulated by the political parties for public support and to counter the authoritarian military rule in most of Pakistan's history.³⁰ Therefore, the political organizational setup has been responsible, directly or indirectly, in spreading the agenda of religious organizations. This may be the single most important reason that has prevented the state from fully functioning as a true democracy. Religious organizations have been involved in policy formulations and lawmaking in the parliament and have also had a chance to form the government in one of the province during recent past.³¹ With such greater impact of religion in the society, it is very difficult to denounce religious beliefs and to counter the narrative of radicalized religious belief. Pakistan is peculiar in this

²⁸ "Role of NGOs in Pakistan," August 6, 2014, <http://theroleofngosinpakistan.blogspot.com>.

²⁹ Nida Kirmani, "Interactions between Religion, the State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Some Implications for Development," Lahore University of Management Sciences, 2011, <http://lums.edu.pk/docs/dprc/Interactions-between-Religion--the-State-and-Civil-Society-in-Pakistan-Nida-Kirmani.pdf>.

³⁰ Ibid., 3.

³¹ Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of religious political parties, remained in power from 2002–2007 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province.

respect because elsewhere religious organizations have not been given such greater political voice. Almost 25 Islamic political parties take part in the electoral process directly or indirectly.³² Although they have not enjoyed overwhelming support of the public, their participation in the political process has prevented the state from developing into a true secular democracy. All these faith-based organizations are a product of the Madrassa and mosque culture of Pakistani society. Their leaders or governing bodies are mostly individuals that have been educated in the same Madrassa systems where the modern world today finds roots of radicalized Islam and fundamentalism and eventually terrorism.³³

3. System

Having discussed the individual and organizational level of information environment of Pakistan, we will now analyze the civil society of the country as a 'system of systems.' In Pakistan the term 'civil society' is used as a generic term including citizen organizations and initiatives, networks and alliances working in the context of social, and economic, religious, and cultural fields.³⁴ These could be formal or informal. The formal category includes political parties, non-governmental organizations, trade unions, professional associations, philanthropies, academia, pressure groups, and think tanks. The informal category includes faith-based organizations, burial societies, shrines, seminaries, neighborhood associations, jirgas (councils of elders), and savings groups. In the last 10–15 years, the information environment of Pakistan has affected civil society in many ways. The media boom has transformed the way people think and behave, which in turn has changed the way the organizations act/react to different scenarios. In addition, social media have also had deep-rooted impacts on the civil society as illustrated by the lawyers' movement for restoration of

³² Robert Boggs, "Pakistan's Pashtun Challenge: Moving from Confrontation to Integration," *Strategic Analysis* 36, no. 2 (2012): 206–216.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Saeed Saqib, Rohde Markus, and Wulf Volker, "ICTS, an Alternative Sphere for Social Movements in Pakistan: a Research Framework," (Department of Information Systems and New Media University of Siegen, Germany).

Chief Justice of Pakistan. The peculiarity of the information environment of Pakistan remains as these mobilizations (carrying political aspects too) are mainly orchestrated by civil society because people have very limited access to the information technology services.³⁵ As discussed earlier, TV and radio have taken prominence in Pakistan, so a lot of emphasis is being put on information dissemination through these media. However, their use is still limited due to lack of social amenities like electricity in the rural areas across the country. Therefore, civil society still relies on culturally influenced and non-modernized means of information dissemination.




Figure 2. Factors contributing to information environment of Pakistan

³⁵ Ibid., 1–4.

For the purpose of this research, since we divided the populace into political and religious attributes at the individual and organizational level, we discuss the political system of Pakistan in relation to the information environment. Islam has become an important aspect of the political system of Pakistan. It is pertinent to understand how information flows in this system for the purpose of influence and decision-making. For that, it is important to analyze how religious parties affect or influence the decision making process of the state. These parties' ability to demonstrate support for their various agendas is a testament of coherent internal structure, policymaking processes, and relations between the leadership and the rank-and-file. These aspects of party functioning are, therefore, as critical to understanding their role in the polity and prospects of influencing policy in the future as in understanding their relationship to the state.³⁶ Close analysis reveals that they are not dependent on any modern day information systems for establishing communication within their ranks. Use of social media, Internet, and TV channels is very limited. However, use of radio, and extensive use of DVD/CDs is a recurring phenomenon. The main reason is to counter the limitation of literacy among the followers. An illiterate person can listen and follow better than read and follow. That said, there has been evidence of extremists in Pakistan trying to attract other media through violent acts for the projections of their militant activities. The recruitment centers and political support of religious parties still originates from Madrassas and traditional ways of communication through mosques and door-to-door preaching. Recently, online mediums and social media have been successful in Pakistani society (e.g., in the 'lawyers' movement in 2007, protests against controversial cartoon drawings of Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him), and the humanitarian social movement during

³⁶ Ibid., 1.

floods in 2010). However, the loss of Pakistan-Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI)³⁷ in recent elections (which dominated social media) is another proof of our assertions that social media does not reach a majority of the population in Pakistan.

Pakistani media has a vibrant landscape that enjoys relatively more freedom as compared to other nations of Southeast Asia.³⁸ More than 40 television channels show a host of programs of common interest. Radio channels are numerous and considered primary sources of information for the rural areas.³⁹ Media demographics reflect a multi-linguistic, multi-ethnic, stratified class society, which shows a clear divide between Urdu and English media. The political system of Pakistan has transformed completely in the last 10–15 years due to this vibrant media. Culturally influenced methods of communication, though dominant up till now, will surely see transformation too. Social media have shown effects, and with a rise in the literacy rate of the society, will have an exponential influence in the society.

D. CONCLUSIONS

1. Information can be used to as a tool to influence, usurp, disrupt, or corrupt adversary's decision-making mechanism.
2. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems; it is exploited by friend and foe alike.
3. Propaganda is developed in the information domain of the information environment, which uses physical domain tools like TV, radio, print, and electronic media, and some orthodox means to affect the cognitive domain (which may be public opinion).

³⁷ PTI is considered the third political force in Pakistani that is based on mainly youth membership. It enjoys lot of control over social Media and modern means of communication. Before the recent elections in May 2013, it was believed that PTI may have gained Political influence to defeat the contemporary political opponents. Although it did manage to gather second largest vote counts but could not gather rural votes that accounted for more than 60% of the seats in central legislature.

³⁸ Munawar Sabir, "The Role of Media in Creating Values of Nationalism in Pakistan," *Journal of Political Studies*, Vol.18, no. 2 (2011): 22, <http://results.pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Nationalism%20-%202.pdf>.

³⁹ Ibid., 22.

4. Social media have a far reaching impact on social movements, but their use is limited to societies that are Internet savvy, have higher literacy rates and have better social-economic conditions.
5. The Pakistani information environment is characterized by Mullah, mosque and Madrassa at the individual level. At the organizational level, it has a religion based organization (political and non-political), whereas at system level, the role of religious parties in political system of Pakistan provides legitimacy to militancy in the name of Islam.
6. Mosques and Madrassas are at the elementary level of the information environment of Pakistan that resonate extremism and fundamentalism in the society.
7. The information environment of Pakistan is based on culture, rather than on technology.
8. The Pakistani information environment is dominated by culturally influenced methods of communication, including word of mouth, TV, and radio.

III. TERRORISM STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN

This chapter covers the reasons for the rise of extremism in Pakistani society, the contribution of government policies, and the effect of regional powers. Various terrorist organizations in Pakistan and their connections will be covered with focus on their communication architecture. Considering the current ideology of world terrorist organizations, followers of that ideology in Pakistan, connection with world terrorist organizations; Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was identified as most active by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.⁴⁰ TTP conducted 103 attacks inflicting 510 deaths and more than 900 injuries in 2012 (only in Pakistan). The group claimed responsibility for 70 percent of these attacks, typically via telephone following the incidents.⁴¹ This chapter will be limited to TTP, considering it is the most dangerous terrorist organization in Pakistan. It is considered that this network gives oxygen to the other smaller terrorist networks for their activities and survival. The chapter is laid out as per the framework of information environment set for this thesis work; following systems, organizations, and individuals.

A. BACKGROUND AND FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TOWARD TERRORISM

Since its independence, Pakistan has faced an abnormal atmosphere in domestic and international politics since. The hostility of neighboring states, weak economic conditions, refugee influx and their settlements, confounding foreign relations and military intervention in running state affairs, have made the situation even worse. Corruption was adopted as a culture at all levels of national and domestic affairs. Democratically elected politicians, once at the helm of affairs,

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of State, *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information*, U.S. Department of State Statistical Analysis (2012), <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/210017.htm>.

⁴¹ Ibid., 5.

established organizations to terrorize political opponents (Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto created the 'Federal Security Force' to target political opponents).⁴² Likewise, at ground level, police and other state power-holders were used by political representatives to suppress the weak and deviant. Most of the people lost trust in the system, law enforcement agencies, the judicial system, and the security situation. In such turmoil, the only source of respite people sought was in religion. The political corruption created a vacuum which was filled through religious political parties. Lewis Fry Richardson stated in his analysis about religion:

The one social factor that does have some detectable correlation with war is religion.⁴³

The extremist views took hold in Pakistan, with support from the first Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The war attracted numerous fighters from all over the world to the area in the name of Jihad. Those who wanted to fight Soviets were supported by Pakistan, CIA and other western intelligence agencies. That was the time when Madrassa (religious school) culture took hold in Pakistan. Most of the people in Pakistan cannot afford education and people living in remote areas are very conveniently used by clerics to run Madrassas. These self-sustained (based on donations and good will of local populace) institutions provide 'environment' in which extremist sentiments flourish. The Madrassas became breeding places of fighters, who were taught Jihad as it would suit the purpose of fighting Soviets. Between 1979 and 2003, the number of Madrassas increased from 1,745 to somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000.⁴⁴ Religion was given importance to make Jihadists who also supported freedom fighters in Kashmir who were (and still are) very dear and near to Pakistani

⁴² Ali Jafar Bukhari, "Causes of Terrorism in Pakistan," *PakPolice Magazine* (March 30, 2012), <http://www.pakpolicemag.com/articles/causes-of-terrorism-in-pakistan/>.

⁴³ Brian Hayes, "Statistics of deadly quarrels," *American Scientist* 90, no. 1 (2002): 10–15, <http://www.americanscientist.org/issues/issue.aspx?id=3269&y=0&no=&content=true&page=4&css=print>.

⁴⁴ Daniel L. Billquist and Jason M. Colbert, "Pakistan, Madrassas, and Militancy" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 24.

nation. At the end of Afghan war, most of the fighters in Afghanistan were not disarmed and they continued to participate in the Afghan civil war. The foreign fighters were not trusted or accepted/welcomed by their native countries, and they chose to stay in Afghanistan after the war. The northwestern tribal belt⁴⁵ of Pakistan (FATA—Federally Administrated Tribal Areas) provided a porous and unchecked border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. There the system of government also suited fighters to move freely between the two countries. The Islamic revolution in Iran also played its role and supported religious radicalism in Pakistan. The difference in practicing of religion between Shia and Sunni factions became a source of sectarian killings/terrorism in Pakistan.

Media sensation and publicity enhanced the effects of terrorism in Pakistani society by giving undue coverage to each and every act of terrorism. Eric Hobsbawm in his book “Globalization, Democracy, and Terrorism” suggests that terrorism could be controlled, if it did not provide the publicity oxygen.”⁴⁶ The government of Pakistan could not implement long term and sustained policies on many issues and in many critical situations. The inconsistent policies discredited the government. The most important example is of Afghan Jihad, where support of the Taliban took a U-turn after 9/11. Confused economic policies and mishandling of mineral wealth of Baluchistan also became sources of uneasiness for Balochs resulting in terrorist attacks on government installations. Taking advantage of such an environment, foreign elements found opportunity to use it to their advantage and fuel terrorist activities to destabilize Pakistan. Foremost among them is the Pakistan’s eastern neighbor, which is funding the terrorist networks in Pakistan.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Map of Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is in Appendix C.

⁴⁶ Eric Hobsbawm, *Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism* (London, 2012).

⁴⁷ *Dawn News*, “Pakistan Says Evidence of Balochistan Interference Shared with India,” October 5, 2013, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1047628>.

“Economic development is a more important factor to maintain law and order.”⁴⁸ Social deprivations, poverty, illiteracy, lack of economic opportunities, and terrorism itself resulted in producing more distress and more poverty. Poverty and economic differences (especially in the tribal belt of FATA) created disturbance in the minds of the deprived. The poor felt insecure and could be bought easily. All this influenced the people to mistrust government and society, and to fight for their rights in desperation.

B. SYSTEM OF TERRORIST NETWORKS IN PAKISTAN

Terrorist organizations of Pakistan aim to transform the civil society according to their own agendas. We can also look at terrorism as a system that is affiliated with the global system of terrorism (system-of-systems). For a better description, the terrorist system in Pakistan is classified into three broad categories: (a) religion based, (b) sectarian based, and (c) ethnicity based. Profiles of terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan are provided in Appendix D. Some political parties also use terrorist organizations for gaining street power and influencing sympathizers of some faction and increasing their vote bank during elections. The population of Pakistan is about 75 percent of Sunni and 20 percent are Shia.⁴⁹

Based on the links with world terrorist organizations, lethality in approach, number of terrorist attacks, and the effects achieved from these attacks and casualties, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) appears to be the most lethal in Pakistan. Terrorist attacks in Pakistan were attributed to 18 different perpetrator organizations in 2012; however, Pakistan also had a particularly high percentage of attacks with unidentified perpetrators (82.5 percent) compared to the global

⁴⁸ Uzoma Kingsley, “Terrorism and its Major Causes,” http://www.academia.edu/4271444/terrorism_and_its_major_causes.

⁴⁹ Kallie Szczepansk, “Pakistan: Fact and History,” <http://asianhistory.about.com/od/pakistan/p/PakistanProf.htm>.

average of unattributed attacks (61.7 percent).⁵⁰ Terrorist organizations in Pakistan are quite open to accept responsibility of their acts of terrorism.

C. TAHREEK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)—ANALYSIS

We will focus on TTP analysis both as an organization and as a system that supports other organizations, gains strength, and works as an umbrella for them. Before describing the systems part of TTP, we will provide the organizational setup of TTP, its roots, objective, narrative, and internal differences.

After 9/11, a section of radicals started a movement inside Pakistan to support the Afghan Taliban. Small militant groups operating independently started networking with one another during the period 2002–2004. The Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership, along with Arab, Chechen, Uzbek, East Asian, and Sudanese fighters, crossed over the Pak-Afghan border to take shelter in the northwestern tribal belt of Pakistan. Al Qaeda militants distributed millions of dollars among tribal elders in return for shelter.⁵¹ Many local extremist groups, which were banned in Pakistan, started joining the Taliban ranks in FATA, some as followers, others as partners. The Pakistan Army, amid international pressure, entered tribal areas to hunt for Al Qaeda and Afghan Taliban leaders, which resulted into a full-blown insurgency and terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. In December 2007, the existence of the TTP was officially announced under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud.⁵² TTP and Afghan Taliban both share Deobandi interpretation of Islam and are predominantly Pashtuns.⁵³ In August 2008, the government banned the group, and froze its bank accounts and assets. In 2009,

⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State, *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information*, U.S. Department of State Statistical Analysis (2012), <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/210017.htm>.

⁵¹ Zahid Hussain, "Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam," *IB Tauris* (2006): 148.

⁵² South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ttp.htm>.

⁵³ Ayesha Siddiqi, "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies," *Washington Quarterly* 34 (1) (2011): 149–162.

the leader of TTP Baitullah Mehsud was killed in an attack and Hakimullah Mehsud took over the leadership of the terrorist network. Hakimullah Mehsud maintained the tempo of terrorist acts, but was killed in a U.S. drone attack in November 2013.⁵⁴ The same month TTP shura (consultation/decision-making body) chose their new emir/leader, Mullah Fazlullah.

Inside Pakistan, the TTP has performed as a loose organizational system. However, the leadership keeps a keen eye on associates, and ensures that the central cause is followed and leadership authority is maintained as terrorist acts are claimed by the central Shura. Outside Pakistan, TTP claimed responsibility for the December 2009 suicide attack on CIA facilities in Camp Chapman in Afghanistan, and the attempted bombing in Times Square in May 2010.⁵⁵

1. TTP Objectives

Since its establishment, the TTP through its various demarches has announced the following objectives and principles:

- Enforce Sharia, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan, and perform “defensive Jihad against the Pakistan Army.”⁵⁶
- React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat District and North Waziristan Agency.⁵⁷
- Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area and withdrawal of the Army.⁵⁸
- Demand the release of imprisoned members of TTP and Taliban.

Figure 3 displays the key leaders of TTP.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Zahir Shah Sherazi, “Pakistani Taliban Chief Hakimullah Mehsud Killed in Drone Attack,” *Dawn News*, November 2, 2013.

⁵⁵ Michael Georgy, “Analysis – CIA bomber video publicity coup for Pakistan Taliban,” *Reuters*, January 11, 2010.

⁵⁶ South Asia Terrorist Portal, “Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),” accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ttp.htm>.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.




Figure 3. Key TTP leaders

2. Salience of Senior TTP Leader's Personality

Before describing TTP as a system, it would be appropriate to talk about the key individuals who affect/influence TTP as a system. Moreover, to counter any ideology/network, it is important to understand the character of the group's decision makers. The founder of TTP, Baitullah Mehsud, did not attend school. He shunned media and refused to be photographed, indicating that he stood by the fanatic Talibanized version of Islam. The next TTP emir, Hakimullah Mehsud, was also a dropout from a small village Madrassa in the Hangu district. Unlike his predecessor, Hakimullah posed for photographs and recognized the value of media as a propaganda tool.

The current emir of TTP, Fazlullah, received his initial education from a religious seminary of Sufi Muhammad in Malakand (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan). He married Sufi Muhammad's daughter and joined Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) organized by his father-in-law. Later, he went to fight NATO and the U.S. from the platform of the Afghan Taliban. In 2001, Sufi Muhammad was arrested by Pakistani security agencies, which created a vacuum in the TNSM leadership. Fazlullah felt the need to fill up the vacuum and started preaching in a small mosque in the Swat. Over a period of time, his sermons in the mosque became furious. He launched an unauthorized FM radio channel in 2004, through which he preached anti-Americanism and righteous actions of Taliban to fight U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He discouraged girls' education and preached against watching television and listening to music. He formed armed groups, which patrolled Swat valley, ensured that people obeyed his version of Islam, and terrorized people by killing opponents. He went into two peace agreements with the Pakistani government; both ended in military operations. The last operation (Operation Rah-e-Raast) in May 2009 cleared the valley from Fazlullah and his staunch followers. Fazlullah fled from the area and took refuge in Afghanistan. Since 2009, Fazlullah has been hiding in the Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan, and orchestrating attacks in Pakistan from across the border.⁶⁰ Mullah Fazlullah is also known as 'Mullah Radio' or 'Mullah FM' due to his excessive use of radio broadcasts. He also claimed the responsibility of attacking Malala Yousafzai (a Pakistani girl working for female education).

3. Narrative of TTP

TTP has very affectively identified the weakness of its target audience. The narrative of TTP was built in the prevalent information environment of Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban recruits young men by offering them access to,

⁶⁰ Sherinzada, "Profile: From Mullah Radio to TTP Supremo," *Express Tribune*, November 8, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/628975/profile-from-mullah-radio-to-ttp-supremo/>.

and membership in, social networks, as well as money, power, and respect.⁶¹ Most of the recruits are young unemployed men from under-developed areas. TTP provides them a sense of belonging to a peer group. Identity / group identity is provided to fill up the vacuum which these people have. “The lone-wolves are approached and connected with social community,” as Helfstein states,⁶² for achievement of common goals. They are radicalized during interactions and convinced to volunteer. Poor economic condition of society (especially in tribal areas), lack of infrastructural development, illiteracy, and social injustice are major factors that aid recruitment efforts.⁶³ TTP pays salaries ranging from \$180 to \$240 a month.⁶⁴ Militants also take advantage of the internal displacement caused by military operations and the inability of the government to provide decent living conditions. Due to frustration over government’s failure in these camps, people living as IDPs (Internally Displaced Personnel) reportedly join TTP as a reaction to the deaths of lost family members (even those who died because of pneumonia/diarrhea). TTP also wins hearts and minds of locals by providing free and swift justice, and law and order via their dispute-resolution centers and Sharia courts.⁶⁵ Coercive tactics are also used to recruit fighters or suppress dissent.⁶⁶ In early 2007, terrorists began forcing schoolchildren to sign up for suicide bombing missions in one part of the Tank District of Pakistan, and

⁶¹ Shuja Nawaz, Arnaud de Borchgrave, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (2009): 27.

⁶² Helfstein Scott, *Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism*, Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY, February 2012, 8.

⁶³ Ibid., 19.

⁶⁴ Aamir Latif, “Taliban Finds Fertile Recruiting Ground in Pakistan’s Tribal Refugee Camps,” *U.S News & World Report*, February 9, 2009, <http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/world/2009/02/09/taliban-finds-fertile-recruitingground-in-pakistans-tribal-refugee-camps.html>.

⁶⁵ Shuja Nawaz, Arnaud de Borchgrave, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (2009): 27.

⁶⁶ John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, *The Bases of Social Power* (University of Michigan, 1959), 157.

abducted 30 children for this purpose.⁶⁷ In Swat, the rebels forced the locals to show their support by either supporting the regime monetarily or sending a family member to join them. Those who refused to comply were threatened with eviction or were chased out. TTP militants killed tribal elders and warned others against supporting the government or organizing against them.⁶⁸ The drone attacks conducted by the U.S. also added fuel to the fire and made the tasks of the terrorists easier to produce avengers for the killings and deprivations of their loved ones.⁶⁹ According to the New American Foundation, the 158 drone strikes launched during 2004–2010 have caused anywhere from 311 to 530 civilian casualties.⁷⁰ Such strikes only help the insurgents recruit more fighters. Baitullah Mehsud once succinctly underscored this idea by remarking:-

I spent three months trying to recruit and got only 10–15 people.
One U.S. attack and I got 150 volunteers!⁷¹

4. Affiliations and Sources of Strength

TTP maintains itself as a system by keeping itself attached with external powers and by sheltering most of the terrorist organization inside Pakistan. Overall, the system balances itself; if one approach is dull, the focus shifts to another, whether it be internal or external affiliation in terms of finances, ideology, or material support.

a. External Affiliations

The external affiliations of TTP can be broken down into three sections: the influence of intelligence agencies, the ideological influence from the Deoband

⁶⁷ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Troubled Frontier*, ed. Shehzad H. Qazi, (Washington, 2009), 131–174.

⁶⁸ Tayyab A Shah, "Taliban Exploit Shi'a-Sunni Divide," *Terrorism Monitor* 15 (2010).

⁶⁹ Ali Jafar Bukhari, "Cause of Terrorism in Pakistan," *PakPolice Magazine* (March 30, 2012). <http://www.pakpolicemag.com/articles/causes-of-terrorism-in-pakistan/>.

⁷⁰ Shehzad H. Qazi, "An Extended Profile of the Pakistan Taliban," *Institute of Social Policy and Understanding* (2011): 44.

⁷¹ Shuja Nawaz, "FATA—A Most Dangerous Place," (North West Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2009), 18.

movement in Pakistan, and the influence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda.⁷² Former Interior Minister of Pakistan, Rehman Malik, stated that India was behind most of the terror attacks in Pakistan.⁷³ The involvement of the Afghan intelligence agency/government has also discussed giving directions and shelter to TTP leaders.⁷⁴ Regarding the second factor of external influence, TTP follows the Deoband faction of Islam, draws moral strength from it and gets recruits from Deobandi Madrassas. TTP declares Mullah Omar (head of Afghan Taliban) as its supreme leader and Al-Qaeda's head Osama Bin Ladin (killed in Abbottabad Pakistan) as a role model.⁷⁵ It follows the footsteps of the Afghan Taliban and wants to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. According to the White House counter-terrorism adviser John Brennan, "the TTP has been training with, operating with, and planning attacks with Al Qaida."⁷⁶ In a press statement of September 1, 2010, U.S. State Department stated, "TTP and Al Qaeda have a symbiotic relationship; TTP draws ideological guidance from Al Qaeda, while Al Qaeda relies on the TTP safe havens in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border. This mutual cooperation gives TTP access to both the Al Qaeda global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members."⁷⁷ If seen in the framework given by Malcolm Gladwell in his book 'The Tipping Point,'⁷⁸ Al Qaeda appears to be a *Maven* (source of knowledge) and the

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ *Dawn News*, "India Behind Most Terror Attacks, says Malik," October 22, 2009, <http://www.dawn.com/news/853350/india-behind-most-terror-attacks-says-malik>.

⁷⁴ *Express Tribune*, "U.S. Catches Afghan Govt 'Red Handed' in Plotting with Pakistani Taliban," October 29, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/624306/us-catches-afghan-govt-red-handed-in-plotting-with-pakistani-taliban-report/>.

⁷⁵ Amir Mir, "Pakistani Taliban Form New Alliance with Mullah Omar as Their Supreme Leader," *Gatestone Institute International Policy Council*, February 24, 2009, <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/333/pakistani-taliban-form-new-alliance-with-mullah-omar-as-their-supreme-leader>.

⁷⁶ *Washington Post*, "Transcript of John Brennan on CNN," May 9, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050901442.html>

⁷⁷ Philip Crowley, *Designations of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and Two Senior Leaders*, (U.S. State Department, September 1, 2010), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/146545.htm>.

⁷⁸ Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How little things can make a big difference*, (Hachette Digital, Inc., 2006), 30.

terrorist groups like TTP are the *Connectors*, who join followers with the cause and take them along on the path of terrorism.

b. Financial Support

In addition to the support from external intelligence agencies and terrorist organizations discussed above, which forms the major component, TTP also raises money from donations, drug trade, kidnapping for ransom, protection rackets, and extortion. Regarding kidnapping for ransom, a government adviser in Sindh Province stated that the Taliban ask for the ransom money in foreign currency. In October 2008, Satish Anand, a filmmaker, was kidnapped from Karachi. He was released in Miran Shah area of North Waziristan Agency (FATA) after payment of approximately \$169,000 (against the initial ransom demand of \$530,000.33).⁷⁹ In 2011, Riaz Chinoy, an industrialist, was kidnapped for a ransom demand of \$740,000 (released after payment of approximately \$211,000). A Taliban member, who claimed to be in the group's finance department, said 'donations' amounting to \$80,000 per month are collected in the Karachi area; these are supposedly protection money to prevent Taliban attacks. Truck drivers, who transport NATO supplies to Afghanistan from Karachi, regularly pay protection money to the Taliban to prevent attacks on their convoys or families.⁸⁰

c. Political Affiliations and Support

A few political parties in Pakistan still support TTP for their vested interests. Such parties not only include the religious parties like Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) and Jamat-e-Islami, but the main stream political parties with partial support of some faction of TTP (Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz group patronage of TTP affiliates). The support is at times in the shape of opposing

⁷⁹ Faraz Khan, "Satish Anand Released from Captivity After 6 Months," *Daily Times*, April 13, 2009.

⁸⁰ Zia Ur Rehman, "Taliban Recruiting and Fundraising in Karachi," *CTC Sentinel* 5, no. 7 (2012), <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/taliban-recruiting-and-fundraising-in-karachi>.

strict measures against them (Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf) or keeping a soft corner to keep their vote bank healthy. JUI-F and Jamat-e-Islami leaders were involved in negotiations with the government (from the TTP side), held from March to June this year. JUI-F chief has always been a key mediator between TTP and the government. He played an important role in freeing government employees and others kidnapped by TTP in the Doaba area of the Kohat District in 2009.⁸¹ Jamat-e-Islami's former chief declared Hakimullah Mehsud a martyr once the TTP emir was killed in a drone attack. Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (the party in government), had a seat adjustment during elections with Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), former Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP), an affiliate of the TTP, during last provincial elections in Punjab.⁸² TTP affiliations in terms of militant organizations include the groups that used to operate against India and sectarian targets; Lahskar-e-Zil, 313 Brigade, Lahkar-e-Jhangvi, Harkat-ul-Jihadi-Islami, Tehreek-e-Islami, Islami Taliban, Jaish-e-Islami and Al Hizb. Differences have also been observed with a few militant organizations like Jaish-e-Muhammed, Harkatul Mujahideen, Jamiatul Mujahdeen and Lashkar-e-Taiyba, mainly for their pro-government stance.⁸³

5. Internal Differences of the TTP

Within the TTP, there are differences between Salafists and Deobandis. The Salafist members of the TTP practice a harsher interpretation of Islam and consider the Shia infidels. On the other hand, Deobandi followers are more flexible in comparison, and generally do not support killing Shia unless they themselves are attacked by them.⁸⁴ During the time of former TTP commander

⁸¹ Zia Ur Rehman, "Posts Tagged 'TTP-JUI-F Connection,'" *PIQUE* (December 9, 2012), <https://afpakwatch.wordpress.com/tag/ttp-jui-f-connection/>.

⁸² Amir Mir, "Punjab govt may not act against LeJ PML-N has seat adjustments with defunct SSP," *The News*, February 22, 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-21114-Punjab-govt-may-notact-against-LeJ-PML-N-has-seat-adjustments-with-defunct-SSP>.

⁸³ Stanford University, "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan," *Mapping Militant Organizations* (2012), <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/105>.

⁸⁴ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ttp.htm>.

Hakimullah Mehsud, differences were observed between him and Waliur Rehman, who also influenced a portion of TTP followers. After the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, differences arose during the selection of a new emir of TTP. Khalid Mehsud (known as Khan Said Sajna, and a follower of Waliur Rehman) was expected to become the new emir as he belonged to the dominating Mehsud tribe. However, the leadership was handed over to Mullah Fazlullah (a non-Mehsud) who hailed from Swat. Though Fazlullah's appointment was expected, analysts and locals from Waziristan believed his status as a non-Mehsud TTP leader and his living across the border in Afghanistan would neutralize his strategic skills and vast fighting experience, and that some Mehsud Taliban leader could challenge him and cause cracks in the umbrella organization in the future.⁸⁵ Sajna's men did not accept a non-Mehsud as the new emir, while Shehryar Mehsud (the other key leader supporting Fazlullah) and his followers defended the decision of Shura and accepted Fazlullah as new emir. The Sajna group represented TTP leader Waliur Rehman (killed in drone strike), and Shehryar Mehsud followed Hakeemullah Mehsud. The actual fight between the two groups started due to differences in talks with the government (initiated by the current government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif). The split seems more on a tribal basis than any religious or ideological difference. A senior TTP commander said Fazlullah can influence the Taliban in Afghanistan, but not in the tribal parts of the country. This vacuum of strong central leadership has caused split in TTP, and this is the reason that Taliban commanders stick to their tribal identity rather than their religious affiliation.⁸⁶ Afghan Taliban tried to mediate peace between both factions of TTP, but fighting continued and during the last couple of months (before the military operation in North Waziristan Agency began) many key commanders were among 40–60⁸⁷ Taliban killed due to infighting of TTP factions.

⁸⁵ Sherinzada, "Profile: From Mullah Radio to TTP Supremo," *Express Tribune*, November 8, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/628975/profile-from-mullah-radio-to-ttp-supremo/>.

⁸⁶ Manish Rai, "TTP A Divided And Falling House," *The Daily Afghanistan*, May 8, 2014.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

6. TTP Relations with Other Tribes in FATA

Until recently, the core strength of TTP derived from the Mehsud tribe; although the dynamics are changing with Fazullah's taking over as emir of TTP (discussed above). Within the Mehsud tribe, Qari Zainuddin/Misbahuddin Mehsud lead some factions that opposed the TTP.⁸⁸ TTP's relationship has varied with Ahmedzai Wazirs, which is another important tribe of South Waziristan Agency. The tribe has supported as well as opposed TTP on different occasions.⁸⁹ The Bhattani tribe from the South Waziristan Agency has also opposed TTP, primarily because of its history of bloody feuds with the Mehsud tribe.⁹⁰

7. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan—Analysis as a System under Trust and Influence Models

Trust is a word that has four elements: a truster, a trustee, expectations, and context. It is the most important binding force in any system or network. Dark networks especially need trusted relations for their existence. Understanding 'trust,' further reveals that people establish trusted relations in times of distress, crisis, risk, and uncertainty. Regarding the TTP, we need to understand that post 9/11, the Afghan situation created an environment in the tribal belt/northwestern region of Pakistan, bordering Afghanistan, which saw mushroom growth of radicalized organizations trying to be part of the global system of Jihad with the Afghan Taliban. The legitimacy of these organizations was built on a single point agenda, 'Trust in Religion' (radicalized version presented by clerics). Therefore, we can infer that in this model, 'trusters' were the Islamic radicalized elements of population, 'trustee' were the Madrassas (their Imams), 'expectations' were to be

⁸⁸ Mukhtar Khan, "A Profile of the Late Qari Zainuddin Mahsud," *Jamestown Foundation* (2009), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35220.

⁸⁹ Iqbal Khattak, "Ahmedzai Wazir to expel Mehsud's militants from its areas," *Central Asia Online*, May 13, 2010, http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/pakistan/2010/05/13/feature-02.

⁹⁰ Stanford University, "Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan," *Mapping Militant Organizations* (2012), <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/105>.

part of noble cause as Allah wills with Pakistan withdrawing from the coalition of U.S., and the 'context' was the post 9/11 situation.

A trusted network system exercises social power derived out of its linkages and cause. The elements of social power are quite complex and have been described by many different sociological and psychological theorists. The terms *influence*, *power*, *decision making*, and *authority* have been used interchangeably.⁹¹ French and Raven define social power as the "potential influence of one person over another."⁹² Cartwright notes that two factors determine A's power over B; (a) resources of A and (b) motive base of B.⁹³ French and Raven have classified social power as reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, referent power and expert power.⁹⁴ To counter a network system, it is prudent to understand its social power dynamics. This is important because terrorist network system (like TTP) take their strength from society, which is their best breeding place. French and Raven are of the view that reward power and coercive power are related. Both involve A's ability to manipulate the attainment of valences.⁹⁵ The extent of power is directly related to the magnitude of reward or coercion. Here trust may be considered as a belief of B that A possesses such ability; thus, B's behavior gets influenced by mere presence of A in the environment. We observe that TTP relies mostly on coercive power. The beheadings of people and security personnel in public, makes them powerful in the society. There have been incidences where TTP even executed (believe to be) informants in public to exemplify punishment for traitors.

⁹¹ John L. Swasy, "Measuring the Bases of Social Power," in *NA - Advances in Consumer Research* Vol 6, eds. William L. Wilkie, Ann Abor, (MI : Association for Consumer Research, 1979), 340–346, <http://www.acrwebsite.org/search/view-conference-proceedings.aspx?Id=9226>.

⁹² John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, *The Bases of Social Power* (University of Michigan, 1959), 156–157.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, *The Bases of Social Power* (University of Michigan, 1959), 156.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 156–157.

Therefore, to diffuse coercive power we need to inculcate a sense of security and trust in the system.

Legitimate power⁹⁶ is probably the most complex form of power addressed by French and Raven in their “Bases of Social Power” model. As it stems from a variety of prescribed social relationships; trust may not be important it is with other forms of power. French and Raven denote it with behavioral expressions like “should,” “ought to,” or “has right to,” which obviates any notion of trust or expectations, or at least makes you think about your obligation rather than expectations. Therefore, we can safely imply that trust (under the prism of legitimacy) may be necessary for smooth working, better understanding, and greater productivity, rather than affecting the bases of power relation, be it a father/son, CEO/subordinate, or even military commander/troops relationship. Since this legitimacy has its basis in cultural values and social structure; trust would be facilitated by the presence of “normative coherence,”⁹⁷ which also determines the ‘range, and influence of legitimate power.’ This form of social power is derived by the TTP from religion. The Madrassas, which are considered holy places of religious education, have been used by the TTP to recruit fresh blood and establish legitimacy of their cause with promises of heaven’s after life, if martyred while fighting enemies of Islam. We need to counter this legitimacy of their cause by controlling Madrassas education and involving Muslim scholars from all sects to clearly define the parameters of conflict and to put the historical evidences into the right perspectives which have been used otherwise by the terrorists.

Since 9/11, studies into terrorist network systems have brought forward the idea of a nodal framework where the value created by different nodes makes them part of the greater system based on common cause (or fame) of Al-Qaeda. During his days in Iraq, General McChrystal observed that the enemy appeared

⁹⁶ John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, *The Bases of Social Power* (University of Michigan, 1959), 158.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

as a constellation of fighters, organized not by rank, but on the basis of relationships and acquaintances, reputation, and fame. Who became radicalized in the prisons of Egypt? Who trained together in the pre-9/11 camps in Afghanistan? Who is married to whose sister? Who is making a name for himself, and in doing so burnishing the al Qaeda brand?⁹⁸ This behavior of individuals under Al-Qaeda's influence forms a good example of what French and Raven have termed as referent power.⁹⁹ This is a serious concern for the Pakistani military, while conducting counter-insurgency operations in the FATA region. The porous border with Afghanistan in the northwestern region makes it difficult for the forces to isolate these networks from their links across border. Similarly, expert power is also related to the TTP's claim that they are true representatives of Islam, and that whatever they do is what Allah wills them to do. This narrative needs to be addressed by exposing the evil faces through extended media campaign against the group.

⁹⁸ Stanley A. McChrystal, "It Takes a Network," *Foreign Policy* (2011): 184, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/it_takes_a_network.

⁹⁹ John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, *The Bases of Social Power* (University of Michigan, 1959), 161.

IV. COMPARATIVE STUDY—INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT AND TERRORISM

This chapter covers the measures taken by the Sri Lankan government to effectively counter the LTTE (Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in 2009, and by the United States to curb the spread of terrorism there after 9/11. We chose to study the Sri Lanka model, as it was a recent example of a developing country defeating a terrorist organization. The strength of LTTE, frequent use of suicide bombers and its psychological support from the Tamil diaspora all around the world, made the organization very strong with an effective information operation campaign. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security gives a futuristic view of how technology can be best made use of to counter terrorism. In order to manage the length of the chapter, only relevant details are being covered, keeping in mind that these details have some relevance to counter terrorism in Pakistan.

A. SRI LANKA AND LTTE (LIBERATION OF TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM)

Before discussing the Sri Lankan fight against the LTTE, we shall briefly look at the information environment of Sri Lanka with focus on all three dimensions: the information domain (how information flows), the physical domain (use of infrastructure), and the cognitive domain (to understand the target audience). Sri Lanka has a 91.2 percent literacy rate (2008–2012),¹⁰⁰ and the primary languages are Sinhala, Tamil and English. 74.88 percent of population is Sinhalese (largest ethnic group) and 11.2 percent are Tamils.¹⁰¹ The news and media use all three major languages (Sinhala, Tamil, and English). Television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and the Internet are the main sources that spread information. The fast growing usage of the Internet, television and radio

¹⁰⁰ UNICEF, “Sri Lanka—Statistics,” accessed on August 19, 2014, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sri_lanka_statistics.html.

¹⁰¹ Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, *Sri Lanka Census of Population and Housing 2011—Population by Ethnicity* (Sri Lanka Government, April 20, 2012).

has resulted in reduction of newspaper readers. The Sri Lankan government kept tight control over the media due to the fear of an anti-government campaign. Since 1992, four successive governments did not issue radio broadcast licenses to non-profit, non-governmental, or cooperative groups, perceiving the concern that they may take an anti-government stand on social and political issues.¹⁰² However, in 2002 when the LTTE and Sri Lankan government entered a peace talk, the government permitted the LTTE to broadcast the 'Voice of Tigers (VoT)' radio channel and to import U.S. \$10,000 worth of radio equipment.¹⁰³ VoT became the main source of information for local and international media. Television broadcast was also largely viewed across Sri Lanka, as the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC) was able to reach 84 percent of the population.¹⁰⁴ The Sri Lankan government made it compulsory to broadcast the state television news bulletin on other channels.¹⁰⁵ Many news agencies and journalists were threatened for their critical views about the government in 2008/09. The editor of The Sunday Leader newspaper was killed in 2009 allegedly for anti-government coverage.¹⁰⁶ Under such circumstances, VoT and the propaganda campaign of the LTTE continued to gain support of Tamils. The LTTE was also successful in indoctrination of young Tamils for suicide attacks. The conviction behind such daring acts was a strong belief in the afterlife, "there are no bodies, only seeds, they say. Once the dream of Tamil Eelam is achieved, the story goes; they will rise up as trees."¹⁰⁷ In some cases, the indoctrination was believed to be based on becoming heroes' for other Tamils. Sri Lanka is also following the world with social media shaping to be major source of information

¹⁰² Linda Brady, "Colonials, bourgeoisies and media dynasties: A case study of Sri Lankan media," *Central Queensland University* (2005): 10, <http://ejournalist.com.au/v5n2/brady2521.pdf>.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁰⁶ *BBC Sinhala*, "Lasantha shot dead," January 8, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2009/01/090108_lasantha.shtml.

¹⁰⁷ "Tamil Tigers: Discipline, death and martyrdom," last updated June 9, 2006, <http://www.religionnewsblog.com/14893/tamil-tigers-discipline-death-and-martyrdom>.

flow and perception management. A research study conducted during the 2010 Presidential Election among undergraduates of the University of Colombo, found that first-time voters were influenced by social media videos /campaigns. The results revealed that peer interactions through social media were a significant source of influence for political attitude formation.¹⁰⁸

The Sri Lankan tactics to eliminate the LTTE are being studied by many security establishments, as these did not conform to the well-known theories and widely-practiced counter-insurgency teachings. The social movement of Tamil Tigers took the shape of insurgency in 1970s. Mishandling of the situation and adoption of poor policies by the majority Sinhala (74 percent) ethnic group led to the insurgency, which lasted till 2009. The objective of the LTTE was to create a separate homeland for the Tamils known as the Tamil Elam (State) in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka.¹⁰⁹ The geographic location of the LTTE stronghold was different from the Pakistani Tribal region where terrorist can easily slip away in mountains. The LTTE insurgents could not run away unobserved in the waters of the Indian Ocean. However, the strength of the LTTE was much more than the terrorist groups Pakistan is facing. We shall discuss the LTTE more as a system than an organization, because of its capability to run a parallel government and hold a field army of around 20,000, along with a sizeable navy and an air force. Tamil Tigers made use of GPS guided systems for missile accuracy well before the Sri Lankan military did.¹¹⁰ The LTTE had the hybrid strategy and capability of using combination of insurgency, irregular warfare, suicide attacks, and conventional warfare to achieve its end state,¹¹¹ which was to create a Greater Tamil Elam for Tamil community. The individual

¹⁰⁸ Ruwangi Chandrasekhar, "The Emergence of Social Media," *Sri Lanka Print* (2) (2013): 16.

¹⁰⁹ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>.

¹¹⁰ Lionel Beehner, "What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN," *Small War Journal* 3 (8), (2010).

¹¹¹ Udaya Perera, "Defeating Terrorism through a Politico-Military Strategy: The Sri Lankan Experience" (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2012), 31.

part of the LTTE was also very effective and important. Its chief (Velupillai Prabhakaran) was a key element in upkeep of the LTTE and his elimination was a target set by the Sri Lankan government to defeat the LTTE.

1. The LTTE Structure and Governance

The LTTE¹¹² was organized into two wings; a military wing and a subordinate political wing. Overseeing both was a central governing committee, headed by the the LTTE Chief, Velupillai Prabhakaran. This body had the responsibility of directing and controlling several subdivisions. The central governing committee also had an International Secretariat, which was in charge of the outfit's global network. Prabhakaran headed the LTTE power structure, and was assisted by a political advisor and intelligence chief. In the LTTE controlled areas, the organization set up a parallel (to Sri Lankan government) civil administration which included police, courts, postal services, banks, administrative offices, and television and radio broadcasting stations. The police force was organized into several wings, including traffic, crime prevention, crime detection, information bureau, administration and a special force. The LTTE cadres were used to collect taxes and courts administered their version of justice and law.

2. Use of Information Dimensions

LTTE made effective use of its diaspora to lobby against the Sri Lankan Sinhala government. They made use of electronic, print media, and cyberspace. As a violent non-state actor, the LTTE had an edge on propaganda and information over the government as they had no responsibility to the international community on what they had to say or do. In contrast, Sri Lankan action was under the observation of the UN and international NGOs. At the international level, LTTE identified foreign governments as targets and used its diaspora to influence them. Front organizations of the LTTE, namely the World Tamil Forum

¹¹² South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>.

(WTF), British Tamil Forum (BTF), Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), and other lobby groups functioned as LTTE diplomatic missions to carry the LTTE message to the international community.¹¹³ In the UK, the LTTE lobby offered the Labor government some 40,000 votes in parliamentary elections in return for support on Tamil demands in Sri Lanka.¹¹⁴ The campaign carried out by the Tamil diaspora was so successful that the majority of the international community was reluctant to supply arms to the Sri Lankan government. Within LTTE, all cadres were indoctrinated that they were fighting against an unresponsive and discriminatory Sinhalese majority for a separate State—Eelam. The cadres were to banish all fear of death from their minds and be prepared to lay down their lives fighting the Government forces or consume the cyanide pill fastened around their necks when capture is imminent. The LTTE placed immense emphasis on the cult of martyrdom.¹¹⁵

3. The LTTE Financial Situation

To survive as a system, LTTE needed a considerable amount of money. It collected approximately \$200M per year through legal and illegal ventures.¹¹⁶ LTTE collected money from diaspora, fund raisings, coercion, human trafficking, shipping, and legal/illegal businesses. The majority of gas stations in London were owned by Tamils. LTTE trafficked people for a fee as high as \$15,000, and they were forced to protest against the Sri Lankan government else they lose the refugee status (use of coercive power).¹¹⁷ LTTE also reportedly raised money through drug running, particularly heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Ibid., 36.

¹¹⁴ Simon Harris, "Humanitarianism in Sri Lanka: Lessons Learned?" (research report, Feinstein International Centre Tufts University, 2010), <http://www.alnap.org/resource/5865>.

¹¹⁵ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>.

¹¹⁶ Udaya Perera, "Defeating Terrorism through a Politico-Military Strategy: The Sri Lankan Experience" (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2012), 37.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>.

4. LTTE Military System

The LTTE maintained their own army, air force, and navy; however, varying details about the strength of the LTTE were observed. The Sri Lankan Army Commander, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, estimated the strength to be 3,000 in 2007, and then about 4,500 in 2008. At its peak, the LTTE is estimated to have cadre strength of about 18,000¹¹⁹ to 20,000.¹²⁰ The LTTE navy had more than 300 vessels, six submersibles, and 17 large commercial vessels.¹²¹ It was able to influence sea lines of communication with the help of said power. The LTTE air force had 11 aircraft and a considerable quantity of land weapons. The LTTE also had an amphibious group (the Sea Tigers), an airborne group (the Air Tigers), an elite fighting wing, a suicide commando unit (known as the Black Tigers), and a secret intelligence group.¹²² LTTE controlled over 15,000 square kilometers or nearly one-fourth of the territory of Sri Lanka. A study by a UK-based Sri Lankan researcher Dushy Ranatunge revealed that at least 60 per cent of the dead LTTE fighters were under 18 and were mostly girls and boys aged 10–16.¹²³

5. Defeat of LTTE—Steps Taken by Sri Lankan Government

This part of our research will touch upon all the significant measures taken by the Sri Lankan government to defeat the LTTE. The discussion of measures is not limited to the use of information, as discussing the information environment in isolation will not complete the entire picture. However, coverage of various measures is as per their relevance for further development of this research/thesis.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Lionel Beehner, "What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN," *Small War Journal* 3 (8), (2010).

¹²¹ Udaya Perera, "Defeating Terrorism through a Politico-Military Strategy: The Sri Lankan Experience" (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2012), 39.

¹²² South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>.

¹²³ Ibid.

In 1987, the Sri Lankan government made an amendment to the constitution which gave more powers to the provinces to help them in overpowering the ethnic issue of Tamil and Sinhala. Percy Mahendra 'Mahinda' Rajapaksa formed the government in Sri Lanka in 2005 with a will to win the war against the LTTE. He created the NSC (National Security Council), which had representation from all elements of national power to facilitate decision making. NSC also ensured that interference was not done in various department works after policy guidelines were given. The Sri Lankan government grand strategy involved three key elements; define, isolate and defeat.

a. Define

To address the issue of the LTTE, it was important to define the target: who were the LTTE actors? What were their actions? What were their targets? This was similar to defining the enemy in a war for formulation of a comprehensive grand strategy, for all the elements of national power to act coherently. Sri Lankan government focused on actor, action, target, and motive as key factors in defining terrorism.¹²⁴

b. Isolate

Isolation of the LTTE involved the maximum use of the information environment. Isolation of the LTTE as a system was considered in terms of regional and international influence. Diplomatic measures were used at international/regional level, while the government made use of psychological operations to cause differences in the LTTE internally. The government identified India as the key target to isolate the LTTE internationally and Tamil community in Sri Lanka, to isolate the LTTE internally in Sri Lanka. To strengthen the state and weaken the LTTE, Sri Lankan government tried to manage the influence and support from India to the LTTE (sanctuaries and supplies). Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan government also wanted the continued support of SARRC, China, and

¹²⁴ Udaya Perera, "Defeating Terrorism through a Politico-Military Strategy: The Sri Lankan Experience" (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2012), 41.

Pakistan. A special team headed by a cabinet minister was formed to continually engage the Indian government and obtain Indian support. The measures also helped in getting cooperation to fight the LTTE—arms from Pakistan and China, intelligence from India and satellite imagery from the United States to pinpoint and intercept vessels ferrying arms to the Tigers up north. The President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rakapaksa, overhauled Sri Lanka's intelligence system and clamped down on the financial activity of Tamils living overseas.¹²⁵ Wrong efforts and policies of LTTE—antagonizing the Indian government by violating the Indo-Lanka agreement, causing casualties to the Indian Peace Keeping Force, killing Indian former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and relying on the Diaspora, while neglecting and harassing the local Tamil community, helped Sri Lankan government.¹²⁶ Moreover, effective special efforts were used in addition to the diplomatic process and Sri Lanka was able to gain support of 32 countries and isolate the LTTE regionally and internationally.¹²⁷ Government also made an endeavor to isolate LTTE from other anti-state groups. This lengthy process also influenced the break-away factions of the LTTE to join the main stream of politics, further isolating the LTTE from the society. The government backed these splinter movements with military force and money. The major damage to the LTTE was the defection and joining of government by its eastern commander with 7,500 cadres.¹²⁸ The government used the differences between the LTTE eastern and northern wings, making the LTTE leadership (which came from the northern areas around Jaffna) question the loyalty of Tamils from the east.¹²⁹ The Sri Lankan government also ensured that the economic development continued

¹²⁵ Lionel Beehner, "What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN," *Small War Journal* 3 (8), (2010).

¹²⁶ Udaya Perera, "Defeating Terrorism through a Politico-Military Strategy: The Sri Lankan Experience" (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2012).

¹²⁷ Ibid., 41.

¹²⁸ Asoka Bandarage, "The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, ethnicity, political economy," *Peace & Conflict Review* 3 (2) (2009), 194, <http://www.review.upeace.org/pdf.cfm?articulo=80&ejemplar=17>.

¹²⁹ Lionel Beehner, "What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN," *Small War Journal* 3 (8), (2010).

to meet financial requirements, thus striking a balance between use of force and fostering economic prosperity. Subsequently with its information campaign, normalcy in other parts of the country, economic development, and a continuous political process, the national will to fight the LTTE and bear losses and casualties, was maintained until the end.

c. Defeat

To achieve its desired end state, the Sri Lankan government used military power in concert with other elements of national power. During an interview, Sri Lanka's then Army Chief Sarath Fonseka explained the difference between earlier military campaigns and this one in one simple sentence, "this time we were playing for a win, not for a draw."¹³⁰ Sri Lankan military fought like its enemy, organizing smaller units of four-or-eight-man teams that operated as de facto mobile commando squads. They were able to infiltrate Tiger strongholds and assassinate rebel leaders. The government's defense spokesperson, Keheliya Rambukwella, stated in 2009, "we were a conventional army fighting with a guerrilla, and in some form our army was converted to a guerilla [army] to...fight the LTTE."¹³¹ The LTTE areas of occupation were divided into north and east. The eastern part was dealt with first. The military was able to push the militants to two jungles and isolate the civilians with skillful use of information warfare and military maneuvers. The military then sealed off the jungles and cleared them one-by-one. The military operation took one year to complete. In May 2008, provincial elections were held in the eastern province and democracy was restored. A renegade LTTE leader turned politician, Mr. Chandrakanthan Pillayan, took office as the Chief Minister of the Eastern Province with full

¹³⁰ Nitin Gokhale, "Sri Lanka changed the rules in counter-insurgency operations," *rediff news*, June 21, 2010, <http://www.rediff.com/news/column/sri-lanka-changed-the-rules-in-counter-insurgency-operations/20100621.htm>.

¹³¹ Munza Mushtaq, "Sri Lanka's victory over rebels may inform counter insurgency worldwide," *International News Services*, May 21, 2009, <http://www.internationalnewsservices.com/articles/1-latest-news/11731-sri-lankas-victory-over-rebels-may-inform-counter-insurgency-worldwide>.

blessings of the Sri Lanka's ruling party.¹³² In the north, the LTTE tried to prevent civilians' separation from them. The state's military innovatively changed tactics to cater to the new LTTE threats and concepts. The army's SOF Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP) took the lead in destabilizing the LTTE by effectively attacking the LTTE, and calling in strategic air strikes to destroy the LTTE's high value targets. These attacks eliminated and destabilized the LTTE's top leadership and communication nodes. The LTTE rear areas became vulnerable to SOF attacks. Successful deep operations forced the LTTE to employ cadres for rear area security by weakening and exposing the conventional defense fortresses. The high-intensity operation progressed until January 2009 when the army and the government faced a new challenge. The LTTE forcefully kept the civilians with them. The LTTE's R2P (responsibility to protect) concept worked and western governments, without exerting pressure on the LTTE to release civilians, exerted tremendous political pressure on the government to terminate the offensive. However, the government continued the offensive to the end. On May 19, 2009, the security forces completed the humanitarian operation by liberating 295,000 people and killing the entire LTTE leadership including its leader Velupillai Parabakaran.¹³³ To effectively control the flow of information, the Sri Lankan government restricted access of journalists and humanitarian workers to the war zone. Some of the humanitarian organizations and individual journalists were branded as sympathizers of Tamil Tigers,¹³⁴ which helped in reducing the effectiveness of their reports.

The military operation from 2007 to 2009 was quite heavy in terms of battle casualties. Approximately 2,000 soldiers left the battle every month due to death, injuries, and absence without official leave. To effectively cover up the manpower deficiency, about 3,000 soldiers were recruited every month. These

¹³² Udaya Perera, "Defeating Terrorism through a Politico-Military Strategy: The Sri Lankan Experience" (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2012), 49.

¹³³ Ibid., 49–50.

¹³⁴ Jyoti Thottam, "Dying for Journalism: Lasantha Wickrematunge of Sri Lanka," *Time Magazine* 179 (1) (2009), <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1870440,00.html>.

soldiers replaced the 2,000 casualties and the other 1,000 were used to reorganize battalions and raise two additional battalions per month.

From 2007 to 2009, to provide for the large troop requirement, the Sri Lanka army raised 96 battalions, 28 brigades, and 12 divisions.¹³⁵

6. Conclusions from Sri Lankan Model of Fighting LTTE

The salient of Sri Lankan model which merit attention, in view of our research focus are as under:

a. *Grand Strategy*

Everything worked as part of an overall strategy. The government had been fighting the LTTE for decades and learned from the mistakes it made and peculiarities of the LTTE. All these were used to formulate a grand strategy involving all elements of national power. The use of the information environment was not the sole factor for defeat of the LTTE. However, isolation of the LTTE (due to effective management of the information environment) was a significant achievement without which an all-out military operation would not have been possible amidst international pressure and covert support channels of the LTTE. The composition of the NSC strengthened the civil-military relationship. The political leadership of Sri Lanka stood by the military even under tremendous western pressure.

b. *Desperation to Cure*

Having experienced the terrorism of the LTTE for over three decades, the nation and political leadership was desperate to fight and resolve the issues. This led to national unity and set the background to bear losses for a bright and peaceful future.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 51.

c. Information Environment

The Sri Lankan government identified the target audience at the national and international level. At both fronts, the audience was targeted with different means and objectives. The state used information operations to gain support of all the anti-state organizations working on the island to join for the ultimate cause of defeating the LTTE. The government relied on a divide-and-conquer strategy. In the case of Afghan Taliban, the U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has spoken about the need to “peel off those [Taliban] who are willing to renounce violence.”¹³⁶ Similarly, the Sri Lankan government was successful at exploiting fissures within the LTTE leadership, with effective use of the information domain. The appointment of a former LTTE leader as Chief Minister of the eastern province also proved a contributing step to gain support of Tamils and convey a message to LTTE that government was willing to accommodate Tamil concerns. The tempo of operation and information environment dominance, within Sri Lanka, ensured that the military was able to meet the increased recruiting requirements. At termination of the campaign, the army had 21 divisions, 60 brigades and 204 battalions as compared to 9 divisions, 32 brigades and 155 battalions in mid-2006. The strength was increased from 125,000 to 200,000; an increase of 69 percent.¹³⁷ The Sri Lankan government also took advantage of the international psychological environment of fighting terrorism after 9/11 incident. It helped in isolating LTTE and gaining help of the international community, which understood the meaning of fighting terrorism after 9/11. The Sri Lankan government managed the information from the battle zone from only one outlet provided by the state Media Centre. The physical domain was controlled by the state, and only required/treated information was sent out. With this arrangement, the government eliminated the possibility of any other source giving news to the information seekers. Inside Sri Lanka, the government also blocked pro-LTTE

¹³⁶ *NPR*, “Clinton: Military Action Isn’t Enough In Afghanistan,” January 29, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123098927>.

¹³⁷ Udaya Perera, “Defeating Terrorism through a Politico-Military Strategy: The Sri Lankan Experience” (strategy research project, United States Army War College, 2012), 56.

blogs and websites such as Tamilnet.com. The information media were not satisfied with this one-sided picture. This led to an unfavorable situation toward the end of campaign, when the media became too critical toward the government. This teaches a lesson to include media handling as part of grand strategy and deal it effectively at every stage of the fight.

d. *Responsibility to Protect (R2P)*

The LTTE¹³⁸ made use of psychological operations by projecting to the western world that the only way of saving civilians was to rescue them, during the final stages of the battle. Innocent civilians paid the price as at places (especially in the north) they could not be separated and were used to draw the attention of the international community. While R2P should remain as a goal, fighting terrorism in which the enemy resides within the civil population can cause issues related to collateral damage. This would demand effective use of the information environment to prepare the minds of national and international audiences before and during the use of force.

e. *Military Defeat of Terrorism*

The Sri Lankan defeat of the LTTE is an example of military success in crushing/eliminating a terrorist organization. It negates the argument that insurgencies require non-military or political solutions. This type of model is possible with full national support/backing, until military success is achieved. As Seth Jones of RAND and others have noted, military force—although only successful seven percent of the time—tends to be most effective against groups that are “large, well-armed, and well-organized.”¹³⁹ Indeed, the lesson learned from Sri Lanka is that overwhelming force is necessary to win a war against a determined enemy like the Taliban or Tamil Tigers.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 55.

¹³⁹ Seth G Jones, Martin C. Libicki, “How terrorist groups end: Lessons for countering al Qa’ida,” *Rand Corporation* (2008): xiv.

f. Support of International Community

The support of the regional and international community was important to isolate the LTTE. The international community helped the Sri Lankan government in terms of technology and intelligence sharing to track down the LTTE leaders. Colombo also received dollops of military and economic aid from China, which has vested interest in the waterway and ports along the island's southern periphery.¹⁴⁰

g. Regional Geopolitics

Regional dynamics and geopolitics should be given due importance while formulating a grand strategy for counter terrorism. Regional interests and involvement of neighboring countries may pose serious problems in the fight against insurgent groups. In the Sri Lanka and LTTE case, this concern was seen once India got involved in 1980s. International players act for their national interest, and most of the time their interest is aligned with regional powers rather than small nations like Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka's foreign policy towards India, during the 2000/2009 period, paid rich dividends in defeating the LTTE.¹⁴¹ The narrative for gaining regional/international support through information operations should cater for the interest of dominating players.

h. Long Term Solution

Military success is only a temporary solution. Long term political measure would be required to sustain the achievements of a military campaign. If concerns of the Tamil community (ethnic discrimination, economic, and political marginalization) are not addressed, and their rich diaspora is not engaged effectively, the desire for a separate state and ideology will rise again. In 2011, the Tamil diaspora, which funded the LTTE from 1983 to 2009, established the Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Elam (PTGTE) in order to revive

¹⁴⁰ Lionel Beehner, "What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN," *Small War Journal* 3 (8), (2010): 5.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 57.

the separate state ideology. It is a litmus test and a challenge for the Sri Lankan government in the international scene over and above the reconciliation and reconstruction efforts in the post conflict situation to win over the influential diaspora and neutralize their separatism ideology.¹⁴² The audience at the international and national level must be kept engaged, even after the military defeat, to curb resurfacing of terrorism.

B. UNITED STATES (INTERNAL) COUNTER TERRORISM MEASURES AFTER 9/11

The U.S. society is technology savvy in that people have access to advanced information technologies. This enables the easy flow of information and at a higher speeds, especially when everything is linked with the Internet. The right to freedom of speech and information makes information flow easier through the U.S. society. Public broadcasting is therefore an important issue for the government, which is why it is partly government-funded, but also supported by private grants.¹⁴³ Realizing the importance of public broadcasting in shaping public opinion inside and outside the U.S., the U.S. government sponsors TV and radio stations to target public opinion outside the U.S. Within the country, television is considered as the most popular medium of communication. Fox News is the dominant U.S. cable news network.¹⁴⁴ Approximately 10,000 commercial radio stations provide news and entertainment to people belonging to every walk of life. Satellite radio offers a huge collection of channels that attract the vast majority of customers. There are more than 1,500 daily newspapers in the U.S., most of them with a local or regional readership.¹⁴⁵ However, only six giant companies control almost 90 percent of the media,¹⁴⁶ which is considered a

¹⁴² Ibid., 58.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ *BBC News*, "United States Profile," July 8, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-16761057>.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Frances Goldin, Debby Smith, Michael Smith, *Imagine: Living in a Socialist USA*, (HarperCollins, 2014), 189.

cause of non-diversity in news. Like Sri Lanka and most of the other countries of the world, audiences are turning toward the Internet for news, resulting in a decline of printed newspapers. Approximately 270 million Americans are online,¹⁴⁷ comprising more than 78 percent of the population. Seventy-four percent use social networks and blogs.¹⁴⁸ With reliance on use of the Internet, electronic transactions, and other networks for day to day routine tasks, it is much easier to track suspected people and manage the flow of information.

The overall dynamics of how terrorism affects the world environment was seen after 9/11. The U.S. was worst effected by terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and the incidents exposed weaknesses in U.S. security and defense system. The study of measures taken by the government (with focus on internal U.S. measures) would help in determining the best practices to track and counter terrorism by one of the most effected and advanced countries of the world. Here, the scope of the discussion is restricted to measures which may have some relevance for a developing country like Pakistan.

Immediately after 9/11, the U.S. government made laws and passed executive orders to help prevent any further attack. Although laws are strict and at times compromising, civil liberties have been successful in averting any major incident on U.S. soil.

1. U.S. Patriot Act

The Patriot Act was passed within weeks after the terrorist incident of 9/11. It included laws allowing surveillance of citizens and reduced the checks on law enforcement agencies. The measure included powers to conduct surveillance without warrants, monitor financial transactions, and detain/deport suspected individuals. In December 2005, the New York Times disclosed that in 2002 President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to

¹⁴⁷ "InternetWorldStats.com," last updated December 2013, <http://www.internetworldstats.com/america.htm>.

¹⁴⁸ *BBC News*, "United States Profile," July 8, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-16761057>.

access certain phone calls and emails without any legal warrant.¹⁴⁹ In July 2008, Congress passed a bill that gave legal immunity to the telephone companies that participated in the NSA program. The Obama administration continued old laws and further expanded to monitor networks of telecommunications companies and made sure that the technology does not interrupt surveillance.¹⁵⁰ This is a good example of monitoring the physical and information domains of the information environment.

2. Go-It-Alone Defense Doctrine

The new U.S. defense doctrine¹⁵¹ was announced by President Bush in a June 2002 speech at West Point. It summarized The National Security Strategy of the United States, and laid emphasis on pre-empting and taking anticipatory actions to prevent any act of terrorism. The document states: “taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” The doctrine declared that U.S. “will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against...terrorists.” In February 2011, the Obama Administration revised the country’s military strategy, expanding the focus to other areas of potential threats, including Asia and other parts of the Middle East. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America of 2011 recognizes a shift in geopolitical dynamics toward coalitions built on shared ideology and away from cold war alliances. The document outlines four goals: countering violent extremism, deterring and defeating aggression, strengthening international and regional security, and shaping the future military.

¹⁴⁹ Beth Rowen, “Post-9/11 Changes By the U.S. Government,” *Infoplease* (2007), <http://www.infoplease.com/us/history/911-anniversary-government-changes.htm>.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

3. Military Tribunals and Guantánamo

In November 2001, an order was signed that called for foreigners charged with terrorism to be tried by military tribunals and classified as illegal enemy combatants. Such tribunals permitted the admission of hearsay and evidence obtained under coercion, and allowed secret evidence that would be shown to the jury but not the defendant. In addition, the defendant could be excluded from portions of his own trial.¹⁵²

4. Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002

The Department of Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and created the position of Secretary of Homeland Security. The DHS united 22 agencies and 170,000 workers. The department implemented an alert system with two levels: ‘elevated’ and ‘imminent’. The National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) provides detailed information about terrorist threats and recommends security measures to the public, government agencies, airports, and other hubs.¹⁵³ The DHS laid out various objectives to counter violent extremism:¹⁵⁴

a. Understanding Violent Extremism

Support and coordinate efforts to better understand the phenomenon of violent extremism, including assessing the threat it poses to the nation as a whole and within specific communities.

b. Support Local Communities

Bolster efforts to catalyze and support non-governmental, community-based programs, and strengthen relationships with communities that may be targeted for recruitment by violent extremists.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ U.S. DHS, *DHS's Approach to Countering Violent Extremism* (U.S. DHS, Washington, DC, July 5, 2012), <http://www.dhs.gov/dhss-approach-countering-violent-extremism#top>.

c. *Support Local Law Enforcement*

Disrupt and deter recruitment or individual mobilization through support for local law enforcement programs, including information-driven, community-oriented policing efforts that for decades have proven effective in preventing violent crime.

As part of its effort to support local network systems to counter violent extremism, DHS launched a number of core initiatives¹⁵⁵:

- DHS Conferences and Workshops on Countering Violent Extremism

With federal partners, DHS hosts conferences and workshops for law enforcement to better educate them about countering violent extremism.

- Training Initiatives

DHS is working with the Department of Justice and has trained hundreds of thousands of front line officers on suspicious activities reporting and countering violent extremism.

- Grants

DHS has prioritized prevention activities through grants that directly support local law enforcement efforts to understand, recognize, prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist pre-cursor activity, and separately to raise public awareness and vigilance through the 'If You See Something, Say Something' campaign.

- Other Measures

In 2011 a progress report was published by the DHS listing the steps taken (based on recommendations of the September 11 Commission) to protect the country against another terrorist attack. The report noted the following accomplishments:

(1) The "If You See Something Say Something" campaign was launched to raise public awareness about indicators of terrorism and crime, and encouraged citizens to report suspicious activity to law enforcement authorities.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

(2) Screening of passengers flying into, out of, or within the U.S. has been enhanced and all baggage is screened for explosives.

(3) The Visa Security Program has been implemented at 19 areas in 15 countries known for high-risk visa activity. Officials conduct targeted, in-depth reviews of visa applications and applicants before they are allowed to travel to the U.S..

(4) The Country's cyber networks and infrastructure security has been improved through creation of the National Cybersecurity Protection System and the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center.

(5) *Expanded information sharing.* DHS made an effort to control the physical and information domains of the information environment. This helped in apprehending individual terrorists, pre-empting terrorist acts, and tracing out the network. DHS created 72 'fusion centers' throughout the country to gather, share, and analyze threat-related information with federal, state, and local agencies.¹⁵⁶ Major urban areas also began to adopt a Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG) model to bring agencies together to analyze terrorist threats for their jurisdiction and to disseminate intelligence information. The focus later shifted to fusion centers which took an all crime/all hazard approach versus strict counter terrorism approach of TEWG.¹⁵⁷ Internationally, DHS encouraged sharing of information about terrorists and criminals with global partners. A nationwide suspicious activity reporting initiative was created, which trains state and local law enforcement officials to recognize behaviors and indicators related to terrorism, crime, and other threats and standardizes how the observations should be managed.¹⁵⁸ As the time passed, LEAs of large urban areas started using information technology to organize virtually, and to share information in fusion centers. It reduced the requirement of resources, made better linkage among the

¹⁵⁶ Beth Rowen, "Post-9/11 Changes By the U.S. Government," *Infoplease* (2007), <http://www.infoplease.com/us/history/911-anniversary-government-changes.htm>.

¹⁵⁷ Michael Pollard, and Kevin Ward, "Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement's Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security," *Rand Corporation* (2010): 43–44.

¹⁵⁸ Beth Rowen, "Post-9/11 Changes By the U.S. Government," *Infoplease* (2007), <http://www.infoplease.com/us/history/911-anniversary-government-changes.htm>.

participants, facilitated in identifying connections between different terrorist-related activities. Fusion centers centralized and formalized the sharing of information/intelligence among participants and federal intelligence departments. Earlier the information sharing was limited to personal contact and visits of LEA officers to other departments that restricted the speed and amount of sharing of information and intelligence.

Table 1. The evolution of law enforcement information and intelligence sharing.¹⁵⁹

Evolution of Law Enforcement's Information-Sharing Networks and Intelligence Function, Pre-9/11 to Current			
Category	Before 9/11	1-3 Years After 9/11	7-9 Years After 9/11
Focus of intelligence	Criminal intelligence (e.g., gangs, organized crime, narcotics, white collar)	Intelligence evolved to also include a focus on terrorist threats	Further development of intelligence functions; adopting all-crimes, all-hazards approach to intelligence and regionalization trend
Organizational unit	Criminal intelligence or other specialized units	CT units DHS encourages adoption of TEWG	All-crimes, all-hazards approach adopted
Network composition	Network specific to certain types of crime	Beginning to examine role of LEA intelligence in national CT and HS strategies Some LEAs build on existing info-sharing networks to include CT and HS, but not common DHS encourages connection of some of local networks	Networks become more formalized and expand in size Fusion centers centralize sharing/formalized relationships Fusion centers more formally connected to federal intelligence community (FBI, DHS liaisons) LEAs have adopted more aggressive collaboration with federal agencies

In addition to local law enforcement, the FBI shifted its mission to include a focus on Counter Terrorism (CT) following the 9/11 attacks. The FBI is

¹⁵⁹ Michael Pollard, and Kevin Ward, "Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement's Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security," *Rand Corporation* (2010): 42.

designated as the lead federal agency for investigating acts of domestic and international terrorism. Primarily it conducts CT investigations through Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The JTTFs (along with FBI field offices) are responsible for national infrastructure protection and for investigations involving domestic and international acts of terrorism and the use of WMD. The JTTFs are composed of teams of state and local LEA representatives, FBI agents, and representatives of other federal agencies. In addition, the FBI has directed that its field offices become involved with the fusion centers, given their growing role in the sharing of homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement information.¹⁶⁰

5. Conclusions from Internal U.S. Measures to Counter Terrorism after 9/11

Keeping in view our research focus, the salient drawn from U.S. model are as under:

a. *Legislative Needs*

For the new kind of threat, amendments in the laws were needed to track down terrorists. U.S. gave legal cover to the LEAs by passing acts/bills/laws, giving expanded powers to monitor communication and financial transactions, and detain/deport suspected individuals. Side effects of such laws can also be observed, especially once they are implemented for prolonged period. Over use of wiretaps on individuals and business, unjustified detention of people, deportation of immigrants, and less scrutiny of LEA acts have made civil libertarians criticize the laws and term them as violation of human rights. Laws, though a must to curb terrorism, need to be reviewed frequently. Moreover, such acts where needed must be supported with an information campaign highlighting their need as the only medicine to cure disease.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 41.

b. *Pre-empt to Counter Terrorism*

The terrorist threat is fast evolving and a reactive strategy may not work. U.S. defense doctrine¹⁶¹ created the required framework on pre-empting and taking anticipatory actions to prevent any act of terrorism. For effective pre-emption, management of the information environment domains is very important. The campaign of, “If You See Something, Say Something,” made information audience as informers. The more effective audience/informers are equipped with identifying and willingly reporting odd activities; decreasing the chance that terrorist acts go unnoticed.

c. *Military Tribunals*

The use of Military tribunals and illegal detention of suspected foreigners (at Guantanamo) may be required from military perspective; however, the U.S. could not make clean use of it. Classification of detainees as illegal enemy combatants and not prisoners of war went against the Geneva Convention. The permission of admitting hearsay and evidence obtained under coercion—without showing it to the defendant—and news about prisoner abuse at few of the detention centers, led to widespread criticism.

d. *Department of Homeland Security (DHS)*

Measures taken by the DHS to understand violent extremism, involve local communities in “If You See Something, Say Something,” increased vigilance at the ports/air ports, awareness and training programs, increased funding for anti-terrorism measures, visa security program, and cyber security, and above all, the formulation and use of ‘fusion centers’ provided the filter to separate extremists from peace loving citizens. The benefits of counterterrorism and Homeland

¹⁶¹ Beth Rowen, “Post-9/11 Changes By the U.S. Government,” *Infoplease* (2007), <http://www.infoplease.com/us/history/911-anniversary-government-changes.htm>.

Security have been comprehensively covered in a RAND report prepared for National Institute of Justice.¹⁶²

Table 2. Summary of the benefits of a focus counterterrorism and homeland security.¹⁶³

Domain	Description
Overall cultural or paradigm shift	Long-term focus on CT and HS represents a cultural or paradigm shift toward greater collaboration, including less-territorial attitudes and more openness in sharing of information. Fewer turf issues among local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
NIMS training	Improved incident management of large-scale events in general (e.g., major sporting events, political events, or major holidays). Improvements in incident management involving multi-agency response, as well as these events allow law enforcement and partner agencies to practice CT and HS response plans.
Other CT and HS training and specialized training	HS training department-wide has improved the cops on the street awareness of WMD and what information to look out for and how to report it to their chain of command. Improved departments' capabilities to respond to CBRNE-related incidents or other types of terrorist threats. HS training is now part of departments' core curriculum with department-wide personnel being trained on WMD awareness and other components of departments receiving more specialized training.
Relationship building with the local community	Increased rapport and relationship building with community leaders. Assignment of special community liaison officers to do outreach to the community, private sector, and to serve as a point of contact for HS-related information.
Specialized tactical response units	Specialized tactical response units that were developed in response to 9/11 to address CBRNE and terrorist-related attacks in general has had a spillover effect in that these units have helped law enforcement response capabilities in general for different types of incidents and emergencies. Specialized response units particularly have benefited from HS grant funding in terms of additional investments in equipment and training.
Information sharing	Improved information-sharing around routine crime and terrorist related incidents.
Incident management	NIMS, as well as other specialized training, has improved incident management of large-scale events.
Grants	The need to have dedicated grants management personnel to

¹⁶² Michael Pollard, and Kevin Ward, "Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement's Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security," *Rand Corporation* (2010): 79–81.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

management	<p>manage HS grants and application process has also resulted in capacity-building within the departments to manage grants in general, and so the marginal costs of managing other grants may have been reduced.</p> <p>It also led to investments in the development of grants management systems (e.g., some departments for the first time set up formal grant databases) to enable departments to better track grant funds and manage grants.</p>
Fusion centers and regional coordination	<p>Improved regional coordination and better coordination among local law enforcement agencies and other stakeholder agencies involved in CT and HS.</p> <p>Increased coordination and cooperation among law enforcement agencies and other stakeholder agencies concerned with CT and HS. Improved information-sharing of crime data benefits not only CT and HS, but also routine crime-fighting. Has improved departments' abilities to address cross-jurisdictional crime and analysis of crime patterns.</p> <p>Improved analytic capabilities, although it varies across departments and degree to which information-sharing takes precedent over analysis of information.</p> <p>All-hazards approach and NIMS training means that departments are better able to coordinate and manage large-scale events involving a multi-agency response.</p> <p>Fusion centers have helped to formalize the diffusion process. In addition, by expanding the fusion centers' networks to include other law enforcement agencies in a region this has led to improvements in informal information-sharing among agencies. Because fusion centers are connecting a number of law enforcement agencies in a region, it has also led to the development of informal relationships across departments (captain in department y now knows who to call in department x with questions, requests for information, etc).</p>
Equipment and technology	<p>HS funding allowed LEAs to purchase equipment and standardize the equipment that all departments were using—however, this came at a significant cost, as discussed above.</p> <p>Specialized tactical response units in particular benefited from the grant funding that enabled purchasing of equipment such as PPE and radiological detectors.</p> <p>LEAs also used HS funding to leverage technology including upgrades to their communications systems to improve interoperability; camera network system for Department D; communications vehicles; bomb robots; laptops to improve virtual coordination within fusion centers.</p>

Equipment and technology (continued)	<p>Technology also benefited non-case study LEAs who participated in the fusion centers and benefited from how the case study departments utilized UASI funding to improve coordination and connectivity with surrounding jurisdictions.</p> <p>LEAs also utilized software (e.g., COPLINK) to help generate leads more easily.</p> <p>Purchasing of equipment also had an impact on morale of employees in that they now felt they had the equipment needed to do their CT and HS and tactical response jobs.</p>
Prevention of terrorist related incidents	<p>This category is the most difficult to quantify. The departments all cited how their activities impacted routine crime-fighting, helped to connect the dots, etc. Difficult to quantify prevention. For example, one department postulated that at least 5 significant terrorist related incidents had been prevented. However, due to security concerns, departments were reluctant to give detailed information. Even so, it was difficult for departments to estimate the magnitude of events prevented.</p>

V. TERRORIST USE OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

A. WHY DO TERRORISTS USE INFORMATION OPERATIONS?

Terrorist organizations have used psychological warfare long before regular forces realized this domain. This is because of the fact that terrorist objectives are achieved psychologically, unlike a war of attrition. Information operations (psychological warfare) are the most preferred options that terrorists have to further their designs. To explore this aspect, we will briefly discuss two perspectives of terrorism in this chapter to see why terrorists use the information environment in the first place. First, the chapter examines Maurice Tugwell's psychological strategy of terrorism. Tugwell suggests that terrorists employ a strategy of psychological influence, relying on the use of terror to coerce a government to make changes favorable to their cause. This strategy leverages the power of information to cause change and Tugwell claims "terrorists are in the business of changing minds."¹⁶⁴ Subsequently, the chapter addresses Gordon McCormick's terrorist influence process model. McCormick's model provides insight into how most terrorist organizations exploit the information environment to influence their targets. His model walks through a four-step process that terrorists take to achieve their influence objective.¹⁶⁵ Subsequently we would relate our findings to teachings of Al Qaeda (umbrella organization for most terrorist organizations around the world) in this domain.

1. Maurice Tugwell's Psychological Strategy of Terrorism

Maurice Tugwell's book "Democratic Response to International Terrorism," 1991, which is based on his experiences in Northern Ireland, has shed insight into the psychological strategy of terrorism. Tugwell's perspective of this phenomenon suggests that terrorist organizations employ a long-term

¹⁶⁴ Norman E. Emery, "Terrorist Approach to Information Operations" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 10.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 10.

psychological strategy to achieve their objectives. His approach supports this thesis by providing insight into why terrorists conduct violent attacks, and then offers evidence that terrorists rely on the psychological influence of their violence to achieve their objectives.¹⁶⁶ Furthermore, Tugwell's explanation illustrates the terrorists' natural bridge to the information environment. Tugwell contends that the terrorist threat to societies and states is more about the adverse psychological influence they cause than the actual physical damage they inflict. He says "that terrorism essentially conforms to the Carl von Clausewitz' claim that war is the continuation of politics by violent means."¹⁶⁷ Tugwell states that physical force replaces the failure of peaceful persuasion; however, persuasion remains the objective and the ultimate purpose of each action. He states that in the end "terrorists are trying to change the minds of their enemies."¹⁶⁸ Terrorism, more than any other form of conflict, moves back and forth across the line between peace and war. "One day its leaders address the public through the news media, in the manner of politicians; the next day, they blow an airliner out of the sky to underline their point."¹⁶⁹

An ancient millenarian Jewish terrorist group known as the Zealots serves as an example to support Tugwell's claim. From AD 66–73, the Zealots ruthlessly assassinated anyone having to do with the Roman Empire: army soldiers, administrators, and Jewish collaborators. Using short daggers, known as Sica, the terrorists would stage an attack in a busy square of the city or in an alley jammed with people. "The intimidator power of the Assassins rested on their reputation of always killing their chosen victims, however long it took."¹⁷⁰ The killing was usually very dramatic; the terrorists would emerge and slit the throat of the victim and then quickly retreat, blending back into the crowd. The violent

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 10.

¹⁶⁷ Janos Radvanyi, ed. *Psychological operations and political warfare in long term planning* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 1.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 11.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 2.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

attacks were designed to have long lasting psychological repercussions far beyond the immediate audience—the 10 to 20 people who witnessed the event. Over time, the vicious reputation of the Zealots spread by word of mouth throughout all of present day Israel. Their reputation preceded them in the information environment to shape the perception of thousands of people, especially those opposed to the group and sympathetic to the Romans.¹⁷¹ As Tugwell points out, the Zealots relied more on the psychological influence of their reputation to influence the populace than the slaying of their victims.

2. Gordon McCormick's Influence Process of Terrorism

Gordon McCormick, former Rand analyst and current Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, suggests that nearly all terrorists follow a common influence process to achieve their objectives.¹⁷² McCormick's influence model also supports Maurice Tugwell's psychological strategy mentioned above. McCormick suggests that terrorists are naturally linked to the information environment, since they must follow logical steps in order to influence a decision maker. Figure 4 depicts McCormick's influence process model with four steps and three orders of effects.

¹⁷¹ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), 88.

¹⁷² Norman E. Emery, "Terrorist Approach to Information Operations" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003).




Figure 4. McCormick influence process model¹⁷³

In the first step, the terrorists attack the immediate target, often involving dramatic acts of violence intended to capture the eye of the media. The immediate targets are often victims with no authority or individual ability to influence the government. Many terrorist attacks first appear like indiscriminate attacks; however, this is not true. Terrorist chose targets for their maximum publicity and to influence specific target audiences.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Ibid., 12.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., 26.

The second target is the media, which generates the first order effect. The terrorists normally cannot control how the acts will be reported (negatively or positively). Knowing this, many terrorist organizations operate their own underground television, radio, and print media outlets. They also maintain their own informational websites on the Internet. Often they deliver a direct message to the media through a proxy courier or phone call. During the recent U.S. war in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden provided videotaped interviews to Al-Jazeera in order to deliver his message.¹⁷⁵

The third step is when the media serves as the distribution point, propagating scenes of the attack to a wider audience, which is the target of influence. The second order effect occurs here. Today's technology often allows near-real time video coverage of events. Al Qaeda's attack against the U.S. World Trade Center and Pentagon and the Chechen hostage taking in Moscow serve as two examples of the media providing live coverage of an attack. CNN alerted the entire world to the first attack against the Pentagon and World Trade Center and then provided live footage as the second American Airliner exploded into the side of the World Trade Center and the subsequent collapse of the building. Another example came in 2003, with the live coverage of 50 Chechen terrorists holding nearly 900 Russian theatergoers hostage. Video coverage highlighted the commandos attempted rescue. The police employed gas during the attack to incapacitate the terrorists. Unfortunately, due to the concentration of the gas and poor health conditions of many of the hostages, over 100 hostages died during the attack. The media provides the terrorists with a conduit to four different audiences: opposing, uncommitted, sympathetic, and active. The third order effect occurs when the target of influence reacts. The measure of success is determined by who gains and benefits, impacting the terrorist group and completing the cycle.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 26.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

The 1972 attack at the Munich Olympic Games provides an example of McCormick's influence model. Eight members from the PLO's Black September Organization had planned to take several Israeli athlete hostages and then make demands against the Israeli government to release Palestinian activists being held in prison. With the advent of television and worldwide broadcasting, the world watched as the German police foiled the Palestinians' original plan to move the hostages from helicopters to an awaiting Lufthansa 747 airliner. During the ensuing gun battle with the Germans, a PLO activist leaped from one of the helicopters and tossed a hand grenade back into the cabin behind him, murdering all nine Israeli athletes with a hand grenade.¹⁷⁷ Although the Black September operation failed to secure the freedom of their comrades in prison, the shock and violence of the attack at the Munich Stadium had a profound influence on television viewers around the world. The Israeli Olympic athletes served as a superb immediate target for the terrorists. The media coverage of the Games ensured that millions of people would be watching. Although Black September's operation received negative publicity from the horrific fate of the athletes, the greater world audience became aware of the plight faced by the Palestinian refugees. Hoffman quotes Abu Iyad, the PLO's Intelligence Chief, admitting,

they did not bring about the liberation of their comrades imprisoned in Israel as they had hoped, but they did attain the operation's other two objectives: world opinion was forced to take note of the Palestinian plight, and the Palestinian people imposed their presence on an international gathering that had sought to exclude them.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), 72.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 73.

B. AL-QAEDA AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

*All that we have to do is to send two Mujahideen to the farthest point East to raise a piece of cloth on which is written Al Qaeda in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic and political losses without their achieving for it anything of note.*¹⁷⁹

–Speech of Osama bin Laden broadcast in 2004

Emphasis on information by Al Qaeda is apparent by going through its manual, the Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants.¹⁸⁰ The document mentions 'information' as one of the requirements of a military organization to assist in 'confrontation and endurance.' Further, the document defines the following missions for its followers that have information as a major constituent: gathering information about the enemy, the land, the installations and the neighbors; spreading rumors, and writing statements that instigate people against the enemy; kidnapping enemy personnel, documents, secrets and arms; blasting and destroying the embassies; and attacking vital economic centers. These missions define the importance that an organization like Al Qaeda places on information as an asset and a tool for the conduct of its operations. The Jihad Manual also mentions that it is important to nullify the viewpoint of intellectuals and thinkers who oppose its view toward Jihad and the establishment of an Islamic state.

The mention of Colonel John Boyd's OODA¹⁸¹ (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) loop is also seen in the Jihad Manual, but from a different perspective where it mentions that the members of the terrorist organization should have 'necessary qualifications' that include: intelligence and insight, ability to observe

¹⁷⁹ Osama bin Laden, from the transcript of a videotaped message released and aired on the Al Jazeera television network, as reported in the Washington Post on Nov 1, 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16990-2004Nov1.html>.

¹⁸⁰ "Declaration of Jihad Against the Tyrants," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p15040coll2/id/3642>.

¹⁸¹ Ulhas Kirpekar, "Information Operations in Pursuit of Terrorists" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).

and analyze, and an ability to act. These qualifications, along with keeping secrets and concealing information, confirm that information and the processes involved in exploiting information have been adequately ingrained in the Al Qaeda operating philosophy. The importance placed on the information environment by Al Qaeda could be gauged from the quote by their second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

I say to you: that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And that we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.¹⁸²

The physical environment in which the terrorists operate is carefully crafted with the information environment always in perspective.¹⁸³ Some cases, where the physical events are seemingly random, also tend to create a positive impact for the terrorists in the information environment.¹⁸⁴ The adaptability of using information as an important resource, and the information environment as the dominant battleground, has created a virtual balance between conventional forces in the world and a comparatively small number of terrorists around the world.¹⁸⁵ This ability of the terrorists to adapt in the information age is predominantly due to opportunities that they have accepted in using modern information technologies. In their paper, Arquilla and Ronfeldt have also remarked that the information revolution and the enabling information technologies, along with the adaptability of terrorist organizations to mesh into a networked force, are themselves among the primary enabling mechanisms for the emergence and subsequent growth of such non-state actors, with a considerable impact on global security.¹⁸⁶ The importance of information is also

¹⁸² "Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi," accessed July 17, 2014, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf.

¹⁸³ Ulhas Kirpekar, "Information Operations in Pursuit of Terrorists" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ John Arquilla, and David Ronfeldt, "Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy," *Rand Corporation* (2001), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1382.html.

felt by nation states around the world and is evident from the thoughts expressed by former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, before the United States embarked on the Global War on Terror.

There will be, undoubtedly, some things that our military forces and the military forces of others can do. But this is also a war of will and mind, it is a war in which information may be the most important asset that we have. And so we're asking a lot of countries to help us with information.¹⁸⁷

C. TERRORISTS USE OF PAKISTAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Pakistan served as the breeding ground for fundamentalism and radical Islam during the Afghan-Soviet war. Jihad had a different connotation at that time, and was never labeled with terrorism. There was a clear distinction between “freedom fighters” and “terrorists.” The information environment described for Pakistan in Chapter II was purposely flourished and encouraged in its efforts to recruit youth for Jihad (holy war) against the Soviets. The legacy has continued until now, and the seeds of fundamentalism and radicalization are still reaping crops in the Pakistani society. It would be prudent to discuss the exploitation of the information environment of Pakistan by terrorists under the same structure and definition of information environment as described earlier (i.e., aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems with cognitive domain, information domain, and physical domain constantly interacting within this framework). We will try to relate to Maurice Tugwell’s and Gordon McCormick’s theories with our framework.

1. Individuals

Chapter II explains the role of individuals in the information environment of Pakistan. There were no terrorist groups in Pakistan before 9/11. They were all Islamic militants fighting for the cause of Islam. They enjoyed public sympathy

¹⁸⁷ *Washington Post*, “Condoleezza Rice: Text from the transcript of the press briefing,” September 19, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpshr/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/ricetxt_091901.html.

and they were being supported by donations from the public through the Madrassas and mosques of the community. The Jihadists were well respected, as they were not only fighting Jihad in Afghanistan, but also in Kashmir against the oppression of India. The narrative of Jihad as promulgated by the Mullah in Juma prayers (weekly congregational prayers every Friday) was aimed at increasing the legitimacy of war against non-Muslims. Once 9/11 happened, Al-Qaeda was branded the number one terrorist of the world. The entire world came down hunting Al-Qaeda and their Taliban affiliates in Afghanistan. This became the kind of incident Al-Qaeda was waiting for to build its narrative of “war against non-Muslims.” Tugwell and McCormick say that terrorists rely upon an incident as the first step of attacking the immediate target and achieving physiological effects on the society. In this case, the narrative was built in the information domain, mosques and Madrassas were used in the physical domain to gather public sympathy and legitimacy of war against occupying forces in Afghanistan (U.S. lead coalition forces). Pakistan, being the most important non-NATO ally, also came under this narrative and became a target of terrorist attacks. The peculiarities of the Pakistani information environment helped terrorists spread their message using CD/DVDs, audio cassettes, radio stations, and the platforms of mosques and Madrassas. The individual acceptance of the narrative was so great that it even penetrated into the ranks of military forces, and included examples of service personnel who were involved in plotting and executing terrorist attacks.

The example of ‘Lal (Red) Mosque Military Operation’¹⁸⁸ in 2007 against the students and clerics of a Madrassa, called ‘Jamia Hafsa,’ caused a paradigm shift in the threat perception regarding the role of Madrassa and mosque in spread of extremism in Pakistani society. In this particular example, the state tried all possible political means to negotiate, but their conviction (narrative) was

¹⁸⁸ Asad Hashmi, “Pakistan mulls tighter controls on madrassas,” *Aljazeera*, April 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/pakistan-tighter-controls-madrassas-islamabad-201442064231355458.html>.

so strong that even ‘Imam Kabaa’¹⁸⁹ was refuted by them, and eventually military force was used after seven days of siege. Sixty lives were lost on both sides, and the mosque and seminary were damaged.¹⁹⁰

2. Organization

The organizational contribution in the information environment of Pakistan was described in length in Chapter II. Taking the lead for the structure of terrorist organizations, in particular, in Chapter V regarding the TTP, we can safely say that the Pakistani information environment is quite conducive to terrorist aims. Here Tugwell’s notion is supported regarding the “terrorist threat in terms of adverse psychological influence rather than physical damage.” The “first order effect” (McCormick’s second step in the influence model) is achieved through DVDs, radio channels, pamphlets, Jihadi literature, and the door-to-door preaching as discussed in Chapter II. These means are used to publish their acts of terrorism, beheading of soldiers, last words of suicide bombers, claiming the responsibility for a particular incident and most importantly spreading the counter propaganda to military claims. To instill fear and obedience in locals of the area, TTP have been making use of radio programs, and pamphlets called “Shabnama.”¹⁹¹ People are forced to read the Shabnamas and listen to radio programs out of dread and fear, as the terrorists announce their next targets. Those named as targets have to run for life or they would be killed. TTP have a designated media spokesman (Shahidullah Shahid, a well-known figure in Pakistani Media) like any other political party who is seen addressing media from undisclosed locations, giving policy statements. Unlike Al-Qaeda, which was relying on the Al Jazeera network for propagation of their psychological influence in the society (third step in McCormick’s model), TTP enjoys media coverage

¹⁸⁹ Imam KABAA is the Imam of holy mosque at Makkah where millions of Muslims go to perform pilgrimage. He is highly respected among the Muslims around the globe.

¹⁹⁰ Asad Hashmi, “Pakistan mulls tighter controls on madrassas,” *Aljazeera*, April 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/04/pakistan-tighter-controls-madrassas-islamabad-201442064231355458.html>.

¹⁹¹ English translation of “Shabnama” is “night letters.”

more than any other terrorist organizations in the country. TTP has been flexible in modifying its approach to interact with media effectively and reach out to the maximum audience. Baitullah Mehsud (founder of TTP) did not allow his photograph to be taken, declaring it un-Islamic, while the current Chief of TTP makes videos of his interviews and publicizes them. From a country that knew little about TTP as recently as four or five years ago, the Pakistani viewing public has become intimately acquainted with the agenda, views, threats, likes, dislikes, punishments, and statements of the group.¹⁹²

This legitimacy stems from the religious political parties in Pakistan that have yet to condemn openly the aims and objectives of TTP. As discussed earlier, these faith-based political parties have a common origin with the TTP (Madrassas); therefore, it is very difficult to refute the TTP's narrative for them. This makes it possible for the TTP to enjoy political support in the cognitive domain of the Pakistani environment. Allegiance of the TTP with Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban gives them an outlet on international media, but they are considered facilitators more than actors at the international level. That is why the TTP does not rely on social media, the Internet, or other modern physical domains of information environment to spread their message or to act as recruitment centers. The one and only website launched by the TTP was effectively blocked by the state within 24 hours. An image of the TTP website is shown in Figure 5.^{193,194}

¹⁹² Rafia Zakaria, "TTP, winning the war on TV," *Dawn News*, April 4, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1097708/ttp-winning-the-war-on-tv>.

¹⁹³ *Dawn News*, "Tehreek-i-Taliban launches website," April 6, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1098058/tehreek-i-taliban-launches-website>.

¹⁹⁴ Sajjad Haider, "Pakistani Taliban website taken down 24 hours after launch," *Dawn News*, April 7, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1098339/pakistani-taliban-website-taken-down-24-hours-after-launch>.




Figure 5. Screen shot of TTP official website, launched and taken down on April 7, 2014.

3. System

As discussed previously, the political system of Pakistan provides impetus and legitimacy to the cause of the TTP. It no longer exists as an organization, but has transformed into a 'system of terrorism' that provides accreditation to all affiliated organizations. This is a strength, but also presents an opportunity to be worked upon as a vulnerability. The strength of the TTP is in its "narrative" (fight for Islam is a duty of all Muslim), which exists in the information domain. Secondly, and most importantly, the effects generated by TTP in the cognitive domain of the Pakistani environment (political importance, recognition, public support) makes it into a "terrorist network" based on the system of religious radicalization and extremism. The physical domain of this system is the infrastructure, finances, numerical strength, public support, and propaganda tools being used. The peculiar information environment of Pakistan makes it very difficult to isolate the flow of information in this system. The TTP is cognizant of the fact that their system cannot survive without an effective propaganda tool. Establishment of media wing called "Omar TV" with the help of approximately sixty staff members (including qualified cameramen and editors) has been an

effort in this direction.¹⁹⁵ The media teams of TTP accompany the terrorists during active operation (as embedded journalists) to record live action. CD/DVDs of terrorists action are made available in the markets of tribal areas. One such example is Bannu jail break to release more than 380 prisoners awaiting slow moving judicial process. Video of complete operation was released on by the Omar Studio.

TTP as a system of religious terrorism, influences other terrorist organizations to form media wings. A few significant ones are:¹⁹⁶

- Jandullah Studio

This studio focuses on Central Asian States (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens and Turkmenistan). Most of these foreign terrorists know Pashto and Urdu as they have lived in the tribal belt since Afghan-Soviet war.

- Manba al-Jihad Studio

This media group is considered to be working for the Haqqani network. Most of their propaganda is released in Pashtu, English, Urdu and Persian languages. This studio covers Pakistan and Afghanistan.

- Ahya-e-Khilafat Magazine

This Urdu magazine was started by the TTP's Mohmand Agency chapter. But it has grown and almost become TTP's official magazine. It gives TTP version on issues, mostly responding to attacks that come in media against it.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ NazarUI Islam, "TTP Winning Propaganda War?" *The Spokesman*, July 2, 2013, <http://thespokesman.pk/index.php/component/k2/item/246-ttp-winning-propaganda-war>.

D. CONCLUSIONS

1. Terrorists use long-term psychological strategy to achieve their objectives. The violent attacks that terrorists do are more for the psychological effect/influence over the target audience rather than material damage.
2. Media acts as a distribution point for terrorists as it propagates acts of violence. That is why their actions are directed to attract media attention and then achieve first order effects. Due to the role of media, terrorists maintain well-articulated and well thought media policy to support their psychological warfare.
3. If we can control the information environment, we would be denying strategic freedom to the terrorist organizations. It is a difficult task because, friends and enemies alike share the information environment, and to isolate the enemy in such a vague scenario is very difficult.
4. The information environment of each area, region and nation is dependent on its culture, local populace and many other peculiarities. Devising an information operation in a particular environment should involve considering the peculiarities of that environment.
5. Considering the peculiarities of the Pakistani information environment, TTP has relied on DVDs, FM radios, Madrassas, and mosques to spread their message to the masses.
6. Religious political parties in Pakistan are the main source of establishing legitimacy of the TTP as an organization and therefore they do not need special means to reach to masses. Their voice and stance is very easily communicated to even the legislatures.
7. TTP does not have international aims; which limits the outfit geographically, and ideologically.
8. The strength of TTP as a 'system of systems lies in its narrative based on Islam, which needs to be countered at the 'individual' level of the information environment of Pakistan.

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VI. COUNTERING TERRORISM

Information environment management may not be sufficient to counter terrorism. However, it can be a major component to be used effectively in the overall strategy. This chapter will cover the required details by briefly defining the limitations in the grand strategy, and then getting into the details of information environment dimensions that will affect the individuals, organizations, and systems. We will discuss the role of different information domains that cause effects in the information environment. The control of domains is important to formulate a comprehensive information environment management policy. The chapter also supports the suggested measures through a system dynamics model, which would ease decision making and help in formulation of short and long term policy.

A. OVERARCHING STRATEGY

The Pakistani nation will have to be prepared for remedial measures, as security and comfort cannot come together. They are inversely proportional; you increase one and the other will decrease. Handling terrorism with the information environment will take time to show results; however, it has to be an essential part of overall strategy. Military solutions or applications of force cannot produce a long-term solution. Taking the lead from the Sri Lanka counter terrorist strategy against the LTTE, and keeping in view the peculiarities of the Pakistani environment, the suggested strategy to counter terrorism in Pakistan is two staged. The first stage is to counter the TTP, and the second stage (more important one), is based on measures to counter terrorism over a longer period.

The strategy for the TTP is to define, isolate, and enforce law and order, while the long-term strategy is changing societal perceptions, political reforms, and pre-emption. Both strategies would start together, while long-term measures (including enforcement of law and order) should continue. For this thesis, we

shall briefly touch the long-term measures and focus more on countering TTP with information environment control.

B. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

Management of information environment is dependent on cognitive dimension of individual level. Correct identification and handling of this level is essential for effective information operation.

1. Understand/Define the TTP at an Individual Level

There is a need to identify and clearly define the structure of the TTP. Who are the actors and what is their way of working as a system or organization? One fix for all may not be effective to address religious, sectarian, and ethnic extremism. Every issue needs be considered based on actors, objectives, and the way it interacts and behaves in the overall system.

The key individuals and decision makers of the TTP are madrassa qualified (religious education only). Among TTP ranks, most of the militants were not part of the Afghan Jihad with the U.S.S.R. They follow the ideology of Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and the interests of foreign elements. They do not have requisite capability of formulating or modifying ideology at their own without the influence of their masters. They are fighters, who take advantage of opportunities to remain relevant to the overall environment. Defining the TTP is necessary for overall formulation of strategy and coherent response by all elements of national power.

As discussed earlier, the Imam (cleric) responsible for Madrassas and mosques is the key influencer at individual level. Those being used for spreading extremist/fundamentalist narrative (information domain) of TTP should be the key target of any information campaign/policy. Putting checks and balances on the clerics can control the information domain at the individual level. It needs to be understood that religious freedom is part of democracy but spread of hatred and anti-social activities cannot be allowed under the garb of this liberty.

2. Identify Target Audience

Identifying the center of gravity (COG) of the target is important in order to make a lasting blow. Information operation is no different from any other military campaign. In the TTP's case, since the battlefield is asymmetric, it is very difficult to counter the COG of their insurgency. It is evident from our analysis of TTP that their COG is their narrative of Jihad, Holy War, and war against the enemy of Islam. It is also clear that we have to fight this narrative at the individual level and at the mosques and Madrassas. Battle of narrative has to be won in the cognitive domain. This is possible if we generate a counter narrative (in the information domain) and propagate it through the physical domain (mosques and Madrassas) in order to cut the human resource (fresh recruits) supply for terrorist organization. This is yet another reason to bring the madrassa and mosques under state control.

3. Divide and Rule

The internal differences of TTP were discussed in detail in Chapter III. These differences can be easily exploited to weaken the organization. The narrative formulated can target existing differences between individuals following the Salafi and Deobandi versions, Mehsud (Khalid Mehsud alias Khan Said Sajna followers), and non-Mehsud. The TTP differences with Ahmedzai and Wazir tribes can also be fueled to neutralize them. The existing differences provide a good playing field for information environment manipulation and achieving favorable goals.

C. SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS

1. Isolate

Complete isolation of the TTP as an organization or as a system of terrorism may not be possible as effectively as it may be perceived. International/regional environment and involvement of religion in Pakistani society makes the task difficult. The isolation in the information environment is in

terms of cognitive domain. Measures suggested below are the guidelines, peculiar to Pakistani information environment, for isolating the COG (narrative) of the TTP:

- Affect a transitional change in thinking of society that we need to put our house in order first before worrying about others. As a society, we get more worried about what happens to Muslims in Palestine, Iraq, Bangladesh, India, Burma and other parts of the world rather than mending our ways and making Pakistan a better living place. We need to unite the nation through slogans like “This is My Pakistan,” which gives ownness and patriotism.
- Isolate TTP by targeting the cognitive domain of target audiences. Propagate differences between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. Let the people know that the Afghan Taliban are fighting foreign forces, while the TTP is fighting their own people with similar religion, country, and culture; therefore their cause cannot be comparable. The people whom the TTP is fighting are our sons, trying to restore writ of law and provide justice to everyone.
- The concept of ‘Khawarij’¹⁹⁷ needs to be explained to the nation. Such followers of Islam were expected to rise and kill others who do not copy their way of following the religion. The confusion which exists over Muslim killing other Muslims, and who is right and who is wrong - needs to be answered by explaining the concept of Khawarij, to isolate TTP.
- Religious scholars, who are known as teachers of Taliban (Maulana Sami ul Haq), and who claim to be closely associated with TTP (JUI and JI leaders) should be united at the national level under the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII). They should engage TTP in peace dialogue process. Prepare the nation about what the CII wants from TTP (peace and following of true Islamic teachings) and what is the outcome of negotiations. Propagate the extremist views of TTP at all levels.
- To isolate TTP effectively, political support of terrorism and role of religion in politics will have to be stopped. Once TTP and religious terrorism are made unpopular, the political parties will themselves avoid getting associated with any such organization due to the fear of losing votes. In recent past, to gain public support, Imran Khan (a rising politician of Pakistan) advocated dialogue and forgiveness for

¹⁹⁷ “Who Were The Khawarij?” accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.aljamaat.org/islam/articles/a35.htm>.

TTP. Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman, chief of JUI (F), propagates TTP ideology during public addresses; ex-premier of Jamat-e-Islami (JI) regarded Hakimullah Mehsud (TTP chief killed in drone strike) as 'Shaheed'; PML (N) supports Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to gain political strength; Muthahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and few other political parties carries out killings in Karachi for political gains and extortion of money – and the list goes on. It is important to devise a mechanism under the judiciary to implement laws to bring any worthwhile change.

- Associate the TTP with anti-state factors like foreign intelligence involvement. The Pakistani population is very intolerant towards India. Any linkage of TTP and Indian RAW (Indian Intelligence Agency) should be made public.¹⁹⁸¹⁹⁹ The targeting of P3C-Orion in Mehran Base Karachi on May 22, 2011 and Saab-2000 AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning and Control) in an attack on Kamra air base on August 15, 2012 explains the TTP motives. Both the attacks, targeted aircrafts which were strategic assets of Pakistan for a conventional war (India as likely enemy). P3C-Orions were for long range maritime patrol to widen the influence of Pakistan Navy reach in Indian Ocean, and Saab-2000 AEW&C were challenging Indian air superiority in the region.²⁰⁰ Both types of aircrafts were neither used against TTP and were not a threat to terrorists. The issue can be highlighted to unite the nation to fight the TTP, which is being used as a foreign tool to weaken Pakistan.
- To isolate TTP regionally, the government will have to adopt the measures as taken by the Sri Lankan government to fight the LTTE. Increased diplomatic measures will have to be taken to involve international community, especially Indian and Afghan governments. Pakistan resolve to help India in fighting terrorism to stop incidents like Mumbai attacks, once propagated will help in getting some cooperation. Similarly bilateral terrorism pact with Afghanistan to help each other in fighting terrorism and out of capacity help of Pakistan in accommodating 1.6 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan,²⁰¹ may help is getting Afghan government

¹⁹⁸ *Express Tribune*, "U.S. Catches Afghan Govt 'Red Handed' in Plotting with Pakistani Taliban," October 29, 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/624306/us-catches-afghan-govt-red-handed-in-plotting-with-pakistani-taliban-report/>.

¹⁹⁹ *Dawn News*, "India Behind Most Terror Attacks says Malik," October 22, 2009, <http://www.dawn.com/news/853350/india-behind-most-terror-attacks-says-malik>.

²⁰⁰ Najam Khan, "Kamra base attack: some thoughts," *Express Tribune*, August 18, 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/423860/kamra-base-attack-some-thoughts/>.

²⁰¹ *The Guardian*, "UNHCR 2012 Refugee Statistics," June 19, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2013/jun/19/refugees-unhcr-statistics-data>.

support. Pakistan may also have to involve the economic stakes of countries like Iran (through buying gas) and China (giving corridor to Gawadar port) to gain their support and minimize any possible involvement in de-stabilizing Pakistan internally.

- TTP like other terrorist setups is concerned about its image. Omar studio that makes an effort to target multi lingual audiences through release of audio, video, pamphlets, and FM channels speak of TTP efforts to reach out to variety of audiences. The TTP wants attention of its target audience, may it be fear / coercive power or attraction of its ideology. The government will have to limit coverage of the TTP actions, statements, and issues supporting/hinting its philosophy. Reports going to media will have to be managed. Limited outlets of terrorist related news should be allowed for better control and to pre-empt unnecessary alarms. Once terrorists are projected in media, they achieve their objective and indirectly government and media support their purpose.
- Vigorously pursue and expose the TTP about the things it does but hides from people due to fear of losing popularity. Try to hit the cognitive domain of the target audience. Where the views of the target audience cannot be changed, as a first step, confusion and doubt be created. Let the target audience think about the TTP more seriously, especially the the TTP sympathetic audience. Following are a few themes that are specific to the current Pakistani information environment and could be exploited to confuse pro-TTP audience and isolate it:
 - Killing of Muslims in mosques and not targeting brothel houses, dance parties, and other non-Islamic activities.
 - Expose the anti-Shia and Ahmedi stance of the TTP. The killings of peaceful Shia and Ahmedi community, which is completely against religious teachings.
 - Trade of narcotics, illegal commodities, smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, and looting for money. All of these are non-Islamic acts, which have not been associated with TTP in any kind of information campaign or media.
 - TTP leaders caught by U.S. getting help from Afghan government.
 - Rivalries and fight for power within TTP; Mehsud dominance and differences with other factions.
 - Though the TTP Chief Mullah Fazlullah propagates Jihad and sacrifice for greater cause, but fears death (Shahadat)

as he escaped military operation of Swat, and is hiding in Afghanistan. Is sahadat only meant for poor followers of the TTP?

- Why the love of Jannah is not forcing the TTP to fight Jews in Gaza/Palestine? Why they only target Muslims only those who follow religion are killed while offering prayer in the mosques?
- Counter TTP propaganda of being true followers of Islam. Quran says “Killing an innocent person unjustly is like killing all of mankind and saving a person’s life is like saving all of mankind,”²⁰² and what the TTP is doing does not make sense. There have been videos made by TTP showing its leaders Matini, Jangraiz Khan playing football/kicking the chopped-off heads of hostages.²⁰³ These anti-Islamic, anti-human, and brutal acts provide strong bases that convincing any kind of audience should be easy. The TTP and other religious extremist organizations describe/quote teaching of Islam out of context. Such misinterpretations need to be exposed and clarified to make audience believe that whatever the TTP or religious terrorists say needs verification. Similarly, stopping the education of women and not allowing polio vaccines are few examples of anti-Islamic practices.
- To unite the nation and provide strength and motivation to those who are fighting the TTP, it is important to portray Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) as heroes. The task of affecting the cognitive domain of the target audience is not difficult, once TTP is continuously making the mistake of publicizing brutal, merciless, and inhumane pictures and videos of the slaughtering of pro-government people, LEA personnel, and Shias.²⁰⁴ Planned and well thought out postings of such pictures and videos on social media can also earn international sympathy and support.
- The government should project the negotiation effort with the TTP and extend a hand of compromise. The TTP leaders or defected leaders may be given a share in provincial government—showing their followers the seriousness of the state to address their concerns. Imposition of true Sharia (Islamic teachings) will not harm Pakistan; instead, it is the TTP version of Sharia that is dangerous.

²⁰² Quran, “al-Ma’idah,” verse 5:32, <http://quran.com/5/32>.

²⁰³ “Tune.pk,” accessed on August 10, 2014, <http://tune.pk/video/2410288/tehreek-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp-islam-philosophy>.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

Confuse the pro-TTP audience to think that their leaders are not serious to implement Sharia once government is willing to do it.

2. Mosques

Mosque have been used in Pakistan to incite people on the basis of sect, Barelvi, Ahl-e-hadis, and Deobandi (discussed in detail in Chapter II). Lal (Red) Mosque and Jamia Hafsa are the very recent examples, in which the platform of mosque was exploited (details in Chapter V). All the mosques in the country should be made accountable. Imam should be appointed by a district administration on the basis of qualification/exams; merely memorizing the Quran should not be enough to become an imam. Imam should also be given a salary from the national exchequer and powers in civil administration so that it becomes a lucrative job and people with qualifications/qualities are appointed as Imam. A strict ban should be imposed on sectarian preachings. Jumma sermons of every mosque should be recorded and scrutinized by district administration and kept in a database for any forensic requirements. Mosques must not be used for any political gathering or purpose.

3. Madrassas

Madrassas have played a very critical role in the rise of religious terrorism in Pakistan. The former President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, tried to control the syllabus of Madrassas and faced serious opposition from religious and political parties and organizations. However, control over what is being taught in madrassa is the only solution. The word madrassa, when translated into English means school, where all types of worldly education can be imparted. Madrassas should not act as a radicalization centers; rather, the ultimate product should have some technical and worldly education. This would allow the qualified student to adjust into society and earn a living, rather than not finding a career and ultimately becoming trapped by terrorist organizations.

4. Political Solution

We need to learn from the military operation in Swat (where we still lack political/civil strength) and the Sri Lankan defeat of the LTTE, that a political solution would be long lasting and productive. As discussed earlier, the TTP acquires more sympathizers/strengths when the state uses force. In Swat—which we regard as a military success and a defeat of TNSM—the civil administration is not yet able to stand on its own. To support political solution we will have to provide equal justice, develop the areas which are deprived of basic amenities and ensure good governance.

5. Self-Correction in Society

The slogan of “This is My Pakistan” will give a feeling of own-ness to the nation and the responsibility of correcting it. On lines of U.S. campaign, “If You See Something, Say Something,” thinking needs to be developed that if something is going wrong, every citizen has the responsibility to correct it by reporting it. We need to provide critical thinking in the society²⁰⁵ to work on self-correction, and not get carried away easily by the propaganda. Achieving a critical thinking society is only possible through education.

6. Minimize Past Propaganda

There are issues from the past which will keep increasing TTP sympathizer audience if not treated. A lot of ambiguity exists in the society and people sympathize with religious terrorists, thinking that innocent madrassa students were killed in the military operation of Lal Masjid.²⁰⁶ Government should formulate an enquiry board to investigate the causes and reality of military operation. The findings of enquiry should be made public and those responsible for any wrong act (if any) be punished to reduce anger; or the reality of wrong

²⁰⁵ Linda Elder, and Rush Cosgrove, “Critical Societies - Thoughts from the Past,” <http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/critical-societies-thoughts-from-the-past/762>.

²⁰⁶ Pakistan Army conducted an operation on a mosque named ‘Lal Masjid’ in Islamabad in 2007. The operation is supposed to have given rise to pro TTP / religious terrorist view in the society.

doings and miss-reporting of the incidents needs to be exposed. To give credibility to the findings of enquiry, Maulana Abdul Aziz (the head of Lal Masjid at the time of military operation) should be made part of the enquiry board. Similarly, in Baluchistan, bring the reality of killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti²⁰⁷ to the public. Accept the mistake (if proven), punish responsible people or let people know the reality. Without such measures our nation would remain confuse and the vacuum would be filled by anti-state/terrorist elements.

7. Protect Civilians

“An insurgency is a competition between insurgent and government for the support of the civilian population, which provides the sea in which the insurgent swims. Galula reminds us that the counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent. An insecure population will not provide the necessary information to the counterinsurgent.”²⁰⁸ The coercive power²⁰⁹ used by the TTP will have to be countered by protecting the civilian population. Once civilians are sure that they will not be killed or forced to send their youth to join TTP ranks, they will themselves push the terrorists aside and isolate them. However, under the current situation of Pakistani tribal areas in particular, protection of civilians may be difficult.

8. Fusion Center

For both short- and long-term measures, Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) will have to build their capacity to pre-empt any terrorist plot or mount a response in minimum possible time, while fighting terrorists. The current structure of information sharing among Pakistani LEAs is almost non-existent and mainly depends on postal mail or personal contacts. The time consuming procedure

²⁰⁷ A Baloch leader, head of Jamhoori Watan Party, who remained as governor and chief minister of Balochistan province, was killed in military operation in 2006.

²⁰⁸ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), viii.

²⁰⁹ John R.P. French, Jr. and Bertram Raven, *The Bases of Social Power* (University of Michigan, 1959), 156.

limits the efforts to share/gather information, providing more time to the terrorists or perpetrators to escape. Pakistan has put in an effort to centralize the data of citizens (by National Database and Registration Authority—NADRA) and criminals (by Citizen-Police Liaison Committee-CPLC); however, due to lack of education and funds its use in LEAs is limited. Learning a lesson from U.S. model of fusion centers to expedite the sharing of information, development of a networked environment is needed for information sharing. Data centers may be established at the district level having capability of uploading information and data, which is viewable at the police station, LEA agent and vehicle level. The main hub of fusion data centers should be established at the provincial level for better coordination between provinces and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir state. Networking diagram is shown in Figure 6. The networked sharing of information may be combined to include data of all the crimes and hazards (data of National Disaster Management Authority—NDMA). The concept should follow the U.S. model of intelligence collection, information sharing, and analysis. To give fusion centers more strength and increase their efficacy, existing data of NADRA and CPLC should be linked and intelligence agencies be involved to share and update information/intelligence.




Figure 6. Fusion center networking diagram

COPLINK (IBM i2)²¹⁰ or any other compatible software can be used for sharing of information with remote LEA officers/agents. Such software provides platform for information sharing and analysis, allows LEAs to track terrorist link/associates/networks and helps develop a complete picture with limited input of available information, hence enhancing overall efficacy. COPLINK or similar softwares also help in generating reports and carrying out analysis based on history of incidents. Speedy sharing of information reduces time and helps in pre-empting terrorism plots.

The use of information technology for sharing of data and intelligence will help in promoting the adoption of technology; which is limited at lower levels of LEAs. Fusion centers will also help in improved and well-coordinated management of response once multiple agencies are involved.

²¹⁰ IBM, "i2 is now part of IBM," accessed on September 7, 2014, <http://www-01.ibm.com/software/info/i2software/>.

Besides numerous advantages, the adoption of technology will incur costs on establishing a complete network and its associated maintenance. More employees will be required to man and maintain the equipment. Training of personnel and alternative means in case of network outages will have to be accounted for.

9. FM Radio Channels

The TTP chief (also known as Mullah FM or Mullah Radio) is famous for use of FM radio channels. In addition to the routine broadcasts propagating terrorist ideology and religious programs, TTP / TNSM have been observed forcing people to listen to their programs.²¹¹ To control the spread of information and minimize terrorist use of physical and information domain, no such medium should be allowed to be used by terrorist organization to reach audiences. Effective monitoring on range of radio channels should be ensured and any vacuum filled with state sponsored FM channels. The programs of FM channels should include the preaching of religion by religious scholars who have been the teachers of key TTP leaders. The traditions, customs, beliefs, and tribal values needs to be kept in mind while adopting any campaign to influence target audience.

10. Monitor Websites

The TTP has been eager to launch its website. The organization launched its website which was immediately taken down by the government authorities.²¹² Keeping in view the information environment of Pakistan, limited target audience of TTP on Internet, and ease of tracking down the users accessing such websites, government may allow the website to remain on Internet. The material

²¹¹ During evening broadcasts name of people who were on the hit list were announced; either for supporting government or for not obeying terrorist organization. Money was asked in lieu, else the target was killed. Hence, people were forced to listen to the broadcasts.

²¹² Sajjad Haider, "Pakistani Taliban website taken down 24 Hours After Launch," *Dawn News*, April 7, 2014, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1098339/pakistani-taliban-website-taken-down-24-hours-after-launch>.

and propaganda posted on the website should be closely monitored and the frequent users of website be tracked to foil any terrorist plot. Meanwhile, launching of fake TTP websites may also be considered to confuse the users/followers. Such measure is not suggested for FM/radio channels as the audience reached through radio is quite healthy and receivers of radio are passive not allowing the listeners to be traced.

11. Counter DVDs/Videos

The TTP makes videos of most of its operations and markets them on DVDs/CDs or the Internet. Counter propaganda videos may be prepared and marketed, saturating medium of communication and confusing the follower about genuine and fake.

a. Create Online Forums

The TTP mostly targets and fills the vacuum left in teachings of religion and lack of knowledge. Online forums can be created to fill up the vacuum with authentic teachings of Islam.

b. Shabnamas/Propaganda Pamphlets

The TTP uses pamphlets to convey messages of coercion to locals who support LEAs, money extortion, or propaganda. To counter these pamphlets counter propaganda pamphlets (Shabnamas) may be published. Moreover, pamphlets can be prepared that pretend to be masquerading as published by terrorist organizations to create confusion and trouble terrorists.

12. Emergency Laws

The judicial system of Pakistan has not been supporting the fight against terrorism. Majority of apprehended terrorists are freed due to lack of evidence. Collection of evidence is difficult under the peculiar environment of FATA and the circumstances under which the fight with terrorists is going on. We have discussed earlier how U.S. handled the situation with emergency laws. The

“Protection of Pakistan Bill” was passed by the National Assembly on July 2, 2014, which includes such laws and gives additional powers to LEAs for fight terrorism. It is hoped that the bill (though passed after 13 year of fight against terrorism) once implemented will help in addressing such issues.

D. SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELING REPRESENTATION

System dynamics modeling is a technique that helps manage complexity and makes it easier to consider the relationship of multiple interrelated variables that interact dynamically over a period-of-time. The interrelated variables get adjusted/balanced or aggregated on getting information feedback. Religious terrorism (more specifically the TTP) in Pakistan has multiple interrelated factors making the situation complex. We have made an endeavor to keep the model simple and easy to understand for those without knowledge of dynamic modeling. We shall explain some basics of the modeling followed by detailed description of our specific models.

Rectangles represent stocks (reservoirs), double-lined arrows show the flow in and out with valves as regulators, small clouds depict connection to the world outside scope of discussion and arrows with polarities (+ or -) indicate causal influences. A + polarity with an arrow shows that increase (or decrease) in one leads to increase (or decrease) on the other, while a—polarity indicates increase (or decrease) in one leads to opposite effect on the other. Feedback loops are divided into two categories: negative or balancing loops and positive or reinforcing loops. Balancing (B) loops oppose the change while reinforcing (R) loops amplify whatever is happening. For a better understanding (while reading) relate the loop with its color in dotted line and words in *italics*, with the figure.

1. Causes of Religious Terrorism

As discussed earlier, religion is involved in every walk of Pakistani society with the Afghan-Soviet war and Pakistan support to Afghans. Figure 7 shows causes of religious terrorism in Pakistan. The stock and flow that *Madrasahs* played are an important role in increasing the *religious motivation rate* and thus,

religiously motivated people. The nation began supporting the Jihad and the support of their Afghan Muslim brothers. With an increase in *religiously motivated people*, the *radicalization rate* of becoming *religious terrorists* has also increased. From the stock of *religious terrorists*, the outlet is through *removing rate* or *deradicalization rate*. The regulation of inflow and out flow to the stocks is the key to reduce or increase the quantity of *religiously motivated people* and *religious terrorists*. The two main loops in the system are both reinforcing.




Figure 7. Causes of religious terrorism in Pakistan

a. R1— Madrassas Terrorism Loop (green color)

Madrassas with extremist agendas gain strength from other Madrassas and the number of *religious terrorists* in the country. As the number of *madrassas with extremist agendas* increase the *radicalization fraction* would increase to increase the *radicalization rate* of *religiously motivated people* fueling up the number of *religious terrorists*. The whole loop reinforces itself and if no measures are taken, it may result in an exponential increase in the number of *religious terrorists* (though there would be an effect of factors like population growth etc, but they are not being considered for this model).

b. R2 - Weak Governance Loop (brown color)

Weak governance gets strength from *corruption and insincere political leaders* and *foreign anti state motives*. The increase in *weak governance* increases the possibility of establishment or conversion of *Madrassas* into *Madrassas with extremist agendas*. These *madrassas with extremist agendas* increase the *radicalization fraction*, which in turn increases the *radicalization rate* and thus the number of *religious terrorists*. (The *radicalization fraction* is also affected positively by the *foreign anti state motives* and negatively by the *economic stability & justice*). The increase in number of *religious terrorists* (and other types of terrorists) further *weakens governance* and helps the *foreign anti-state motives* and *economic stability & justice* to play their role more easily and effectively.

2. Use of Force and Information Environment Control

Figure 8 shows use of force by military and terrorists/government control of the Pakistan's information environment. Two types of stocks are shown in this model; the *TTP terrorists* stock that increases with the increase in *recruitment rate*, and decreases with terrorists either being *de-radicalized* or removed (*removal rate*) due to *military action* or miscellaneous factors (including *effect of control on information environment*). Second stock is of *anti-TTP population* that increases with *change in support* of neutral or pro-government people to become

anti TTP. People exit from *anti TTP population* stock with change in their thinking to become *pro TTP thinkers*. Next, we shall discuss factors that influence these two opposite stocks with the help of three loops (one reinforcing and two balancing).




Figure 8. Use of force and role of information environment

a. R – Military Action Loop (Brown Color)

The number of *TTP terrorists* increases the percentage of *terrorist actions* which put pressure on conduct of *military action*. The use of force (*military action*) causes discomfort giving rise to *anti-state grievances* (which is also fueled by the *economic instability and injustice*). *Anti-state grievances* help *terrorists* by increasing the *recruitment rate*. As the *recruitment rate* increases the number of *TTP terrorists* and their *terrorist actions* increases, forcing the military to take action (*military action*). This completes the loop which reinforces itself showing that *military action* is not the only solution to fight terrorists / TTP.

b. B1 – Terrorists Action Loop (Green Color)

The balancing loop of terrorists' action shows that the use of force (*military action*) and *terrorist actions* decreases their *recruitment rate*. The strength of TTP terrorists positively affects the number of terrorist actions. More *terrorist actions* force the population to think against the TTP, causing *change in support* and increase in the *anti TTP population*. The increase in *anti TTP population* adversely affects terrorist *recruitment rates*, reducing the number of *TTP terrorists*.

c. B2 – Information Environment Loop (Black Color)

This balancing loop shows the *effectiveness of controlling the information environment* (abbreviated as *effs of control on info envmt* in the model figure). As *TTP terrorists* carry out more *terrorists actions*; they make people *change in support* to become *anti TTP population*. The strength of *anti TTP population* positively influence the *effects of control on information environment*, which balances / reduces the *foreign anti state motives* and *effect of Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban ideology*, which if not controlled would enhance the *recruitment rate* and the number of *TTP terrorists*.

3. Conclusion (System Dynamics Model)

The system dynamics modeling strengthens the belief that use of force alone may not be a solution to counter terrorism. Good governance may appear to be a decisive factor which could handle / counter everything, but in reality if the government is effective, sincere and powerful, it would not let the terrorism to breed by ensuring economic stability, justice and by keeping a check on all the factors giving rise to terrorism. The first model shows weak governance and madrassas with terrorism agendas as the main reasons for the rise of religious terrorism. The second model explains what role the information environment control can play.

The modeling was not aimed at determining the solution for countering TTP / religious extremism, but rather to demonstrate that such options can help understand the complexities of the situation. With sufficient data (which was out of our research scope), the model can be run to understand and solve the complex situation.

E. ISSUES TO CONSIDER

The counter measures suggested in this Chapter may not be implemented without addressing the concerns mentioned below:

1. Regional and International Dynamics

It may not be easy to handle interests/tackle interests of regional and international players. The seriousness of regional and international players in helping Pakistan is very important. Pakistan cannot handle this menace in isolation. Importance of geographic location and interests of international and regional players have to be considered. The porous border, huge presence of Afghan refugees, cultural and historical affiliation of tribal population with Afghans, needs to be taken into account. Our policy must be in line with the cultural and historical requirements. Whatever happens in Afghanistan has an

effect on northwestern areas of Pakistan. We also have to perceive and plan catering for the environment after U.S./ISAF leaves Afghanistan.

2. Can Democratic Government Take Strict Measures?

- With existing relations among PML(N), JUI(F), Jamat-e-Islami and religious terrorist organizations and terrorist wings of political parties like MQM, it may not be easier for a democratic government to take strict measures. Political parties are more worried about losing their votes. A political government may adopt such measures only once the nation is really at the verge/tipping point of accepting harsh decisions.
- The sectarian issues are very critical to handle. With Saudi Arabia and Iran supporting both extremes, the conflicts are difficult to diffuse.
- Almost all the measures require good governance and supremacy of law and order, which are not currently in very good shape. Will we have to wait for governance to improve for the above recommended measures?
- Technical measures would need financial support. Is the nation ready to bear this burden?

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VII. CONCLUSION

The Pakistani information environment is peculiar in its architecture, influenced by its culture, literacy rate, regional politics, and socio-economic conditions of the society. Our research has brought out these peculiarities. We believe that in order to counter terrorism in general and TTP in particular within this environment, it is important to formulate information operations considering these peculiarities. The menace of the TTP (and other like-minded terrorist organizations) was not formed overnight, and could not have formed, if there were no lawlessness, lack of governance, and socio-economic disparity in different classes of the society. These factors created a vacuum in the political system of the country, which gave these insurgents legitimacy in their actions through political support from religious parties.

Fighting the enemy in the physical domain of the information environment is easy, whereas to fight in the cognitive domain is the most difficult part. It is essentially the fight of *Narrative*. As Dr John Arquilla²¹³ opines, it is important for the information warriors to win the “*story of the battle*.” To fight insurgency as an occupying force (ISAF in Afghanistan) is different than fighting your own people (Pak Army against TTP) subject to the same Information environment. The dilemma is more complex in situations where a family member is a militant of TTP and the other is a soldier in the Army deployed to fight these militants. In such a scenario, differentiating between right and wrong becomes cognitively very difficult. It is the strength of the narrative, or counter narrative, that wins the day.

²¹³ John Arquilla is a professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he has taught the special operations curriculum since 1993. He also serves as director of the Information Operations Center. His teaching interests revolve around the history of irregular warfare, terrorism, and the implications of the information age for society and security, <http://www.nps.edu/About/News/Faculty/NPSExpert/John-Arquilla.html>.

As a system, the TTP has a lot of vulnerabilities due to its organizational setup. The cohesion of this network or system of networks is its narrative (COG), which needs to be countered at the individual level in the information environment. Improving government and socio economic conditions of the affected area would deny space to the TTP's influence in the *cognitive domain* at all levels of the information environment. Understanding the *physical domain* of this environment of Pakistan would enable the state to put checks and balances on the spread of extremist/radicalized narrative. Political will is required to counter this menace, for which legislation and subsequent implementation is required at the state level. Use of modern technology requires prudence and that is what we have tried to put forward through this thesis. Strategy would entail use of technology rather technology driving the strategy. To make this decision it is essential to analyze the information environment of the target audience.

APPENDIX A. DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATION STATISTICS FOR PAKISTAN AND SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Year	Pakistan	Egypt	India	Iran
Total population	2009	181,457,277	78,866,635	1,156,897,766	75,967,611
Population aged under 35 (% of total)	2009	73.2	69.5	65.1	68.0
Urban population (% of total)	2009	37	43	30	69
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	2009	2,680	5,680	3,280	11,470
Literacy rate (% of population aged 15 and above)	2006	54.2	66.4	62.8	82.3
ICT Development Index	2008	1.54 (rank 128)	2.70 (96)	1.75 (117)	3.08 (84)
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	2009	61	67	45	72
Internet users (% of total population)	2010	10.4	21.2	6.9	43.2
Facebook users (% of total population)	2011	2.5	9.1	2.3	n. A

Table 3. Development and communication statistics for Pakistan and selected countries. Source²¹⁴: U.S. Census Bureau, World Bank Database, Country profiles of UNESCO Institute for Statistics, ICT Development Index (IDI) established by the ITU for 159 countries, Country profiles on the Internet, and Facebook statistics by country.

²¹⁴U.S. Census Bureau, Mid-Year-Population by 5-year age groups, International Data Base, <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/groups.php>; World Bank Database, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>; Gross National Income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. World Bank Database, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD>; Country profiles of UNESCO Institute for Statistics, <http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/tableviewer/document.aspx?ReportId=143>; ICT Development Index (IDI) established by the ITU for 159 countries with Chad ranking last at a value of 0.79 and Sweden first at 7.85. ITU 2010, 10; Country profiles on Internet World Stats, <http://www.Internetworldstats.com/>; Facebook statistics by country, Social bakers, <http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics>, accessed August 10, 2012.

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APPENDIX B. MAP OF KYBER PAKHTOONKHWA AND FATA



Figure 9. Map of Kyber Pakhtoonkhwa and FATA²¹⁵

²¹⁵ Zar Ali Khan, "What is FATA?" *Fata Reforms*, accessed on September 7, 2014, <http://www.fatareforms.org/what-is-fata/>.

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APPENDIX C. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN PAKISTAN

A. RELIGION BASED ORGANIZATIONS

Today, religion and terrorism have found roots within each other. Role of religious organizations in country politics has made it difficult to refute the extremist views.

1. Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI)

In 1980, Qari Saifullah Akhtar, along with two associates, founded Jamiat Ansarul Afghaneen. After the Afghan-U.S.SR War, the organization was transformed into HuJI with focus on supporting the Kashmiri freedom struggle. HuJI follows the Deobandi school of thought and describes itself as a “second line of defense for every Muslim.” The organization focuses on establishing Islamic rule by waging war. HuJI is inspired by Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. It has an affiliate in Bangladesh called HuJI-B. The Bangladeshi HuJI has been using slogan, ‘Amra Sobai Hobo Taliban, Bangla Hobe Afghanistan’ (we will all become Taliban and we will turn Bangladesh into Afghanistan). With U.S. operation in Afghanistan, HuJI shifted its base to South Waziristan Agency (FATA) in Pakistan, and its men fled to Central Asia, Chechnya, and FATA. The leader of HuJI Qari Saifullah Akhtar escaped to Saudi Arabia and he was later apprehended by Dubai authorities in 2004, and handed over to Pakistan. In 2007, he was released in Pakistan due to lack of evidence. Qari Saifullah Akhtar graduated from Banuri Masjid Karachi and played a key role in Mufti Shamzai’s efforts to unite Osama bin Laden and Mullah Umar for Jihad. He remained as an adviser to Mullah Umar during Taliban regime. Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s men were called Punjabi Taliban and were offered employment by Mullah Umar.²¹⁶ Due to contribution of HuJI, Mullah Omar allowed the organization to build six more ‘maskars’ (training camps) in Kandahar, Kabul, and Khost, where the Taliban

²¹⁶ *Daily Times*, “Significance of Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s arrest,” August 9, 2004, <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/editorial/09-Aug-2004/editorial-significance-of-qari-saifullah-akhtar-s-arrest>.

army and police also received military training. HuJI has also been involved in campaigns inside Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya. At one time, HuJI became the biggest Jihadi militia based in Kandahar.²¹⁷ Qari Saifullah Akhtar was again arrested in 2008, for suicide bombing in Karachi (targeted at former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) but was released by court due to lack of evidence. HuJI, reportedly has links in 24 countries, including India, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Iran, Malaysia, Fiji, UK, U.S., Ireland, the Philippines, and parts of Africa and the West Asia. HuJI was declared a terrorist outfit by U.S. in 2003, and its assets were frozen in U.S. in 2008.

2. Harkat-ul-Ansar (Now Harkat-ul-Mujahideen)

During the Afghan war with U.S.S.R., two organizations (Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) merged to form Harkat-ul-Ansar,²¹⁸ led by Maulana Saadatullah Khan. U.S. declared Harkat-ul-Ansar a terrorist group in 1997, due to its association with Osama bin Laden, after which the organization changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. Harkat-ul-Ansar has reportedly participated in insurgent and terrorist operations in Kashmir, Myanmar, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Pakistan the focus of organization remained on supporting the freedom struggle in Kashmir. Over a period-of-time, the main ideologue Masood Azhar, commander in Kashmir Sajjad Afghani and many other leaders were apprehended. In 1999, Sajjad Ghani was killed in Pakistan while attempting a jail break in. Many of the Harkat-ul-Ansar men joined Lashar-e-Taiba, and after Masood Azhar was released from Indian prison (in a trade-off after Indian Airline flight hijacking), he formulated Jaish-e-Muhammad. Harkat-ul-Ansar is reportedly no more functional.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Harkat-ul-Ansar," accessed on August 19, 2014, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/harkat_ul_ansar_or_harkat_ul_jehad_e_islami.htm.

3. Jaish-e-Muhammed (Army of the Prophet)

Jaish-e-Muhammad²¹⁹ was formulated by Maulana Masood Azhar in January 2000, after his release from Indian jail. Before the arrest in 1999, Maulana Masood Azhar was managing Harkat-ul-Ansar and by the time he was released his old outfit was declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. In 2001, Maulana Masood Azhar was arrested in Pakistan, following the December 13, 2001 attack on Indian parliament. In 2002, Lahore High Court ordered his release due to lack of proof. Jaish-e-Muhammed reportedly is famous for suicide attacks on Indian security forces' bases, camps, and convoys. The organization has close ties with former Taliban regime of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.

4. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) also Known as Jammāt-ud-Dawa (JuD)

LeT²²⁰ was formed in 1990 at Kunar Afghanistan. The organization is headed by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. LeT has been declared a terrorist organization and banned by U.S., UK, and Pakistan governments in 2001 and 2002.

LeT cadre comes from the Wahabi school of thought, and its agenda, as given in a pamphlet titled 'Why are we waging Jihad,' includes restoration of Islamic rule all over India and to unite all Muslim majority regions in countries that surround Pakistan.²²¹ The LeT is involved in the Kashmir freedom struggle, Chechnya and other parts of Central Asia. The LeT does not believe in democracy and nationalism. The organization professes that it is the duty of every Muslim to protect and defend (through Jihad) interests of Muslims all over the world. The LeT cadre comes from Pakistan and Afghanistan with small

²¹⁹ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Jaish-e-Muhammad," accessed on August 19, 2014, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_mohammad_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm.

²²⁰ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Lashkar-e-Toiba," accessed on August 19, 2014, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm.

²²¹ Husain Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 1 (1) (2005): 24.

contributions from Sudan, Bahrain, Central Asia, Turkey, and Libya. The LeT men are also participating in new Jihadi fronts like Iraq. The organization is alleged to have support from its affiliates in U.S. and Australia.

The LeT has links with International Sikh Youth Federation (Lakhbir Singh Rode) and other religious organizations to include Ikhwan-ul-Musalmeen of Egypt and some Arab groups. The organization is financially supported by its community in Pakistan, Persian Gulf, United Kingdom, and Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations. The LeT runs Islamic institutions, schools, medical services across Pakistan. The organization makes use of its website (<http://www.jamatuddawa.org/>), an Urdu monthly journal (Al-Dawa), which has a circulation of 80,000, and an Urdu weekly (Gazwa). It also publishes Voice of Islam, an English monthly, and Al-Rabat - monthly in Arabic, Mujala-e-Tulba - Urdu monthly for students, Jihad Times–Urdu Weekly.

5. Ummah Tamir-e-Nau (Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah)

A scientist from Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, resigned in year 1999 to form UmmahTamir-e-Nau (UTN).²²² The UTN was registered as a non-governmental Afghan relief agency, and most of its key figures included learned people with strong social standings. In 2001, Bashiruddin Mahmood was arrested for alleged links with Al Qaeda. UTN calls itself “an organization engaged in relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction activities.” The UTN refers to the greater Islamic community, transcending national boundaries. The organization has been involved in voluntary work including education reforms, rebuilding schools, hospitals, providing medical supplies, mobile health units, and school books. Bashiruddin Mahmood worked on land development research to find alternate crops in Afghanistan as Taliban banned the production of poppy. The Taliban government

²²² South Asia Terrorist Portal, “Ummah Tamir-e-Nau,” accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/UTN.htm>.

permitted UTN to operate in Afghanistan and to conclude business agreements on behalf of the government.

The UTN has ties with Al Rashid Trust, and indirect ties with Al Qaeda and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). It is also alleged that Bashiruddin Mahmood's team was trying to develop nuclear technology for Osama Bin Laden by smuggling nuclear materials from Russia and Central Asian States. According to Pakistani intelligence officials, travel of UTN officials to Afghanistan and their visas were sponsored by the Taliban's Ministry for Mines and Industries. Bashiruddin Mahmood is reported to have termed Pakistan's nuclear capability as "the property of the whole Ummah."

6. Al Rashid Trust

Al Rashid Trust²²³ is based in Karachi. It was declared a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department in 2001 and its accounts were frozen by the State Bank of Pakistan. The trust was founded as a welfare organization by Mufti Muhammed Rashid in February 1996. The mandate of trust was expanded to include relief activities for Muslims in Chechnya, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Al Rashid Trust shares the Deobandi school of thought with the Taliban and promotes Jihad at places where Muslims are being oppressed. Some of its members are alleged to have received military training in Afghanistan.

Its literature denounces U.S. for its policies toward Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia and praises Islamist terrorists. Al Rashid Trust publishes an Urdu newspaper Zarb-e-Momin and an English paper Dharb-e-Momin; it also runs a radio station out of Kabul. The newspaper has a website that specifically endorses the Taliban's style of governance and is widely considered to be the mouthpiece of the Taliban. The head of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Maulana Masood Azhar, is reported to have published articles in both Zarb-e-Momin and Dharb-e-Momin. As per Maulana Masood Azhar, the efforts of Al Rashid Trust

²²³ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Al Rashid Trust," accessed on August 19, 2014, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al-Rashid_Trust.htm.

have given strength to the Taliban. Al Rashid Trust and JeM are reported to share office spaces and working strength, where required. The trust reportedly manages foreign funds of JeM and was one of Osama bin Laden's sources of income. The trust is linked with the Taliban, Al Qaeda, JeM and many other Islamic terrorist organizations. In Afghanistan, it coordinates its activities with an Arab NGO, Wafa Khairia, which was formed by Osama bin Laden and other Arab-Afghans as a reciprocal gesture for being provided hospitality in Afghanistan.

7. Lashkar-al-Zil (Shadow Army)

Lashkar-al-Zil (also known as Jaish-al-Usrah) is a terrorist outfit linked with Al-Qaeda, and is the descendant of Al Qaeda's 55th Brigade (the elite guerrilla group).²²⁴ It was formed in 1990s during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and is thought to operate in Somalia and Yemen.²²⁵ The Lashkar comprises Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, 313 Brigades, Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan, and former Iraqi Republican Guards.²²⁶ Lashkar-e-Zil has reportedly been involved in attacks on Camp Chapman (December 30, 2009)²²⁷ and Azad Kashmir Pakistan (January 6, 2010).²²⁸

²²⁴ Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda's Paramilitary 'Shadow Army,'" *The Long War Journal* 5 (2) (2009), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_paramilita.php.

²²⁵ Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda Brigade 313 website Goes Online," *The Long War Journal* 6 (8) (2010), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/al_qaeda_brigade_313_website_goes_online.php#.

²²⁶ Syed Saleem Shahzad, "U.S. spies Walked into Al-Qaeda's Trap," *Asia Times*, January 5, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LA05Df01.html.

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ Amir Mir, "Lashkar-e-Zil behind Azad Kashmir Suicide Hits," *The News International*, January 11, 2010, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=217998&Cat=2&dt=1/10/2010>.

8. Haqqani Network

The Haqqani network has its roots from the beginning of the Afghan-U.S.SR war, when it was supported by the CIA and ISI.²²⁹ Reportedly, key figures like Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden, both began the Jihadist fight under the umbrella of the Haqqani Network. The Network is an affiliate of the Afghan Taliban with separate command and control setup. It follows the same ideology as the Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani, is the current head of the Haqqani network, with the base of the network in North Waziristan Agency (FATA). The network enjoys close ties with Al-Qaeda and other foreign extremists in Pakistan. It is considered as “the most resilient enemy network” by the U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan.²³⁰ The Haqqani Network was declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. government in 2012. The network gets financial support from Persian Gulf area, extortions, kidnappings, and smuggling.²³¹

The U.S. and coalition forces have been able to disrupt and degrade the network with increased special operations and drone campaigns. The Pakistan military has also launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb (in June/July 2014) in North Waziristan Agency (the base of Haqqani Network) to sweep and clear the area from terrorists. However, it is considered that despite recent progress, the Network can regenerate if not continually pressured by Afghanistan and Pakistan.²³²

²²⁹ Steve Coll, *Ghost wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10 2001* (Penguin, 2004), 201–202.

²³⁰ Joshua Partlow, “Haqqani insurgent group proves resilient foe in Afghan war,” *Washington Post*, May 27, 2011.

²³¹ Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud, and Brian Fishman, “Inside the Haqqani network,” *Foreign Policy* (2010): 179.

²³² Jeffrey A. Dressler, “The Haqqani Network,” *Afghanistan Report* 6 (2010): 2.

9. Al Akhtar Trust

The Al Akhtar Trust²³³ was founded in Karachi in November 2000, and is headed by Muhammad Mazhar. The main objective of the trust was to support Islamic organizations, including Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The trust was declared a terrorist entity in 2003 by the U.S. for supporting terrorism, assisting Al Qaeda, and raising money for attacks in Iraq. The U.S. Treasury Department has alleged that the trust has been treating injured Al Qaeda's terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The trust is also linked with an individual believed to be part of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl's abduction and killing. U.S. government indicated that the Al Akhtar Trust is performing the activities of Al Rashid Trust and both trusts have been supporting Al Qaeda financially. Reportedly, other terrorist organizations like Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have been using two registered humanitarian aid agencies in Pakistan (Al Akhtar Trust and Al Khair Trust) to deliver arms and ammunition to its men. The Al Akhtar Trust is also linked with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). The State Bank of Pakistan froze the bank accounts of Al Akhtar Trust in 2003.

10. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen organization²³⁴ was formed in September 1989 by Master Ahsan Dar in Kashmir. It is presently headed by Syed Salahudeen, and is reportedly regarded as an offshoot of Jamaat-e-Islami (a known religious political party in Pakistan) formed to counter Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which holds the agenda of making Kashmir an independent state (not part of Pakistan or India). Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was able to redirect? many members of JKLF. The strength of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is estimated to be at least 1500. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is also reported to have contacts with Afghan Mujahideen groups like Hizb-e-Islami, and its cadre has allegedly been receiving

²³³ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Al Akhtar Trust," accessed on August 19, 2014, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/Al-Akhtar_Trust.htm.

²³⁴ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Hizb-ul-Mujahideen," accessed on August 19, 2014, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizbul_mujahideen.htm.

training from experienced Afghan Mujahideens. Most of the activities of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen are linked with Kashmir struggle. After year 2000, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen developed differences and two factions were formulated; one following Syed Salahudeen and its chief commander Abdul Majeed Dar. Both the factions have been reportedly involved in countering each other's strength. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen is also believed to have links with Student Islamic Movement of India.

11. Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws)

TNSM, a Wahabi militant organization,²³⁵ was founded by Maulana Sufi Muhammad in 1992 to impose Sharia (Islamic law) in Pakistan along the lines of the old Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In 1998, Maulana Sufi Mohammed declared that people who opposed Sharia in Pakistan were worthy of death. He declared democracy as un-Islamic. After his apprehension by law enforcement agencies in Pakistan, his son-in-law Maulana Fazalullah (the current chief of the TTP) became the head of TNSM. In September 1998, TNSM threatened to attack American property and abduct Americans in Pakistan unless U.S. apologized to the Muslims for the August 1998 missile strikes in Afghanistan. TNSM cadres have been actively involved in fight against U.S. and coalition forces. The organization established parallel free Sharia courts in the Malakand. The proceedings of the courts used to be in Pushto instead of Urdu (the national language of Pakistan).

TNSM also set up illegal FM radio stations in the Bajaur area to gather men and funds to support Taliban and convince people about TNSM version of Islam. In February, 2006 political authorities of the government closed illegal FM radio channels in different parts of the Bajaur Agency. In 2009, Pakistan military launched operation in Swat area to wipe out terrorists. Area was cleared and

²³⁵ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/TNSM.htm>.

Maulana Fazlullah fled to Afghanistan. He later became head of the TTP after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud.

12. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-Alami (HuMA)

HuMA²³⁶ stemmed out of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) in 2002 after differences over organizational affairs. In addition to other objectives, HuMA also aims at hurting U.S. and her allies. HuMA has a consultative committee which decides about terrorism targets. The organization's significant terrorist act was a failed assassination attempt on President Pervaiz Musharraf in 2002. Chief of HuMA, Muhammad Imran, and deputy chief Muhammad Hanif were arrested and subsequently sentenced to death in 2003 by an Anti-Terrorism Court in Karachi. Most of the top leadership (including chief and deputy chief) are under arrest. HuMA has links Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Taliban and Al Qaeda.

B. SECTARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

Sectarian strife is the second prominent source of militancy in the society. Few of the major sectarian militant organizations are described below:

1. Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) (Movement of the Followers of Shia Sect)

Tehreek Nifaz Fiqah-e-Jafria (TNFJ)²³⁷ was founded by Imam Jafar Sadiq in 1979, after Islamic revolution in Iran. TNFJ aimed to spread the ideas of Iranian revolution leader Ayatollah Khomeini, in Pakistan. TNFJ was transformed into Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) in 1992. Due to a difference in ideology, the organization split into two parts; one headed by Hamid Musawi, the follower of Ayatollah Sheriate-Madari, who continues to use the old name of TNFJ; the other headed by Arif Hussein, the follower of Ayatollah Khomeini's thoughts. TJP

²³⁶ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-Alami," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/HuMA.htm>.

²³⁷ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/TJP.htm>.

aims to create Shia society, protect rights of their community, coordinate efforts of various Shiite groups and fight against imperialism. Other affiliates of TJP include Sipah-e-Abbas, Sipah-e-Ahle-Bait, Imamia Students Organizations and Imamia Organizations. To counter Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP –a Sunni sectarian organization), a sub-group of TJP, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) has emerged as a terrorist outfit, and has been involved in anti-SSP campaigns, target killings, and other terrorist acts. The sectarian violence in Pakistan emerged during/after the Afghan war against the U.S.SR. Mujahideen returned from Afghanistan with weapons and arms and joined such sectarian organizations to continue fighting, as most of them did not fit into the peaceful society. Rivalry between SSP and TJP continues and both sides level the score of killing each other's' cadre. In 1990, SSP founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi was killed, followed by the killing of an Iranian diplomat. In 1997, Jhangvi's successor Zia-ur-Rehman Farooqi was killed in Lahore and in response, an Iranian diplomat was killed in Multan. In 2000, 13 persons were killed in Shia mosque for which adjacent Sunni mosque was used. The fight between both sectarian organizations continues and they still target each other at present.

2. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)

The city of Jhang is located in central Punjab where the majority of land owners were Shias who controlled the society and politics of the area. Sunni's in the area revived their strength with financial power of trading, shop keeping, and transport. After the Iranian revolution, the Sunni community challenged the growing power of Shia's that resulted in formulation of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan²³⁸ by four Sunni religious scholars in 1985. SSP is alleged to be involved in targeting Shia sect inside Pakistan. It also appeared as a political party and contested elections in 1993. One of the SSP leaders became minister in the coalition government in Punjab. In 2002, Pakistan government banned the organization; as a result, SSP renamed itself as Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan. SSP

²³⁸ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/ssp.htm>.

wants Pakistan to be a Sunni state and declares Shiites as non-muslims. It also aims to restore Khilafat system with Sunni Shariat (law). Maulana Zia-ul-Qasmi, a leading SSP leader said in an interview in January 1998, "the government gives too much importance to the Shias. They are everywhere, on television, radio, in newspapers and in senior positions. This causes heartburn." SSP is against Pakistan support of the U.S. fight against terrorism. It supports the Sunni Taliban regime in Afghanistan. SSP joined various religious political parties in Pakistan to form Afghan Jihad Council and declared U.S. actions against Taliban as un-Islamic, and therefore, it was essential for the Muslims to declare Jihad against the U.S. and its allies.

There has been a history of assassination of the SSP chiefs. Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, one of the founding members of the SSP was assassinated in 1990. Maulana Haq Nawaz declared Shias as Kafir (infidel) and instructed his men to promote terrorism in the country to declare the Shias' as Kafir. After Jhangvi's death, Maulana Zia-ur Rehman Farooqi became the head of SSP and was assassinated in 1997. Maulana Azam Tariq, SSP chief and a Member of the National Assembly, was assassinated in 2003. Azam Tariq was a frequent visitor to Afghanistan during Taliban regime. The Sunni extremist outfit is reported to blame Iran as the sponsor of Shia extremism in Pakistan. Hence, whenever a Sunni leader is assassinated, they begin killing Iranians and Shias in Pakistan. SSP is also part of the Afghan Jihad Council that declares war against U.S. forces whenever they use Pakistani soil to fight the Taliban regime. Saudi Arabia (Sunni dominant) has reportedly been supporting the SSP financially to counter Shia's and Iran's dominance. The SSP has also been linked to Ramzi Ahmed Yousuf, one of the accused in the New York World Trade Centre bombing of 1993 (2001?).

3. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)

LeJ²³⁹ is a breakaway faction of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) due to differences in following the ideology of founder of SSP, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. LeJ was founded by Akram Lahori and Riaz Basra, as a Sunni Deobandi sectarian organization in 1996. The organization aims to make Pakistan a Sunni state. LeJ was banned in Pakistan in 2001. Akram Lahori, has reportedly been involved in many terrorist acts including the killing of Ehtishamuddin Haider (brother of then Federal Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider) and Pakistan State Oil Managing Director Shoukat Raza Mirza (all on sectarian grounds). Riaz Basra was involved in more than 300 terrorist incidents. He managed to cause so much fear that the former Prime Minister of Pakistan stopped attending open courts on receipt of a threatening letter from Basra. The leadership of LeJ consists of people who participated in the Afghan-Soviet war. LeJ is organized into independent (no contact with other) small cells of approximately five to eight people. In 2000, LeJ had split into two groups, one headed by Riaz Basra and the other by the Qari Abdul Hai, alias Talha, to address whether to resume ethnic strife. As per media reports, the SSP closed links with LeJ, despite their initial differences. Reportedly, LeJ did not have a shortage of manpower despite deaths and arrests. Both the SSP and the LeJ closed links with the Taliban and played an active role in killing Shias during Taliban regime in Afghanistan. LeJ also reported to have links with Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), and many of LeJ fighters have participated in the Kashmir freedom struggle. The organization also maintains links with Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and Al Qaeda. The LeJ receives financial aid from sympathizers in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. LeJ does not openly interact with the media and relies only on Fax messages and press releases.

²³⁹ South Asia Terrorist Portal, "Lashkar-e-Jhangvi," accessed on August 19, 2014, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/lej.htm>.

C. ETHNIC ORGANIZATION – BALUCHISTAN LIBERATION ARMY (BLA)

BLA was made by the Soviet secret agency KGB to support her greater design in the region after over-powering Afghanistan. KGB built BLA around BSO (Baloch Students Organization) to cause unrest in Pakistan.²⁴⁰ The ideology given to the organization was a stand against the injustice done by the Pakistan government in controlling the wealth of Baluchistan, not following through with requisite development in the province, and unjust distribution of jobs to deprive Baluchis. In February 1973, law enforcement agencies of Pakistan raiding the Embassy of Iraq in Islamabad found huge quantity of small arms, ammunition, grenades and other supplies, which were supposed to be for Baloch rebels.²⁴¹ BLA remained active during the Afghan-Soviet war but the movement died down once the Soviet Union left Afghanistan and its main funding source diminished. It got recognized as Baluchistan Liberation Army in year 2000. The seed of discontentment sowed by KGB is still being used by RAW²⁴² (Indian intelligence agency) and others to fulfil their interests in the area as stated by Sasha (KGB agent) “RAW must have jumped at the chance because last July [2010] the ‘discretionary grants’ budget [a euphemism for espionage fund] was increased by 700 percent in the Indian consulates in Kandahar.”²⁴³ Other smaller allies of BLA include Baloch Liberation Front, Baloch Republican Army, Lashkar-e-Baluchistan, Baluchistan Liberation United Front and BSO (Azad). BLA separatists aim to form a sovereign state of Greater Baluchistan, including Pakistani, Iranian, and Afghanistan Baluchistan territories. The BLA was declared a terrorist organization by Pakistan and the UK. The Pakistan government has

²⁴⁰ Tariq Saeedi, “Pakistan: Unveiling the Mystery of Balochistan Insurgency — Part Two,” *News Central Asia*, July 18, 2011, <http://www.newscentralasia.net/2011/07/18/archive-material-pakistan-unveiling-the-mystery-of-balochistan-insurgency-part-two/>.

²⁴¹ Shahid Saeed, “Caught! [But What?],” *The Friday Times*, March 10, 2011, <http://www.thefridaytimes.com/04032011/page26.shtml>.

²⁴² David Wright-Neville, *Dictionary of terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 48–49.

²⁴³ Tariq Saeedi, “Pakistan: Unveiling the Mystery of Balochistan Insurgency — Part Two,” *News Central Asia*, July 18, 2011, <http://www.newscentralasia.net/2011/07/18/archive-material-pakistan-unveiling-the-mystery-of-balochistan-insurgency-part-two/>.

accused India,²⁴⁴²⁴⁵ of supporting the BLA. The outfit carries out frequent terrorist attacks in Baluchistan to terrorize pro-government supporters and to disrupt the supply of natural gas coming from Baluchistan. In a recent terrorist activity in June 2013, the BLA attacked the Baluchistan residence of Quaid-e-Azam (founder of Pakistan and regarded as the father of the nation), burned the building, and replaced the Pakistani flag with the BLA flag.

²⁴⁴ Saba Imtiaz, "MPs told Russia, India and UAE involved in Baloch insurgency," *The Express Tribune*, December 3, 2010.

²⁴⁵ Mushahid Hussain Sayed, "RAW Is Training 600 Balochis In Afghanistan," *Outlook India*, April 4, 2006, <http://www.outlookindia.com/article/RAW-Is-Training-600-Balochis-In-Afghanistan/231032>.

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